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Industry  important traditional export
industry. AIthough the
liberalization  process  has
Steven Jaffee  been  confUsing  and
nontransparent, and
although problems of
logistics,  finance, and
protected vested interests
remain, some positive  results
are evident - and the future
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Summary findings
Between  World War II and the early 1970s,  Tanzania  and sell  the nuts.  According  to Jaffee,  the reform process
developed  one of the world's largest  cashew  nut  has been characterized  by confusion,  uncertainty,  and
industries.  In 1973-74, marketed  production  reached  latent government  controls  and interventions,  though the
145,000  tone (about 30 percent of world production),  industry  shows  some signs  of recovery.  Based  on a recent
with cashews  providing  an important  source of income  survey,  Jaffee examines  the liberalization  process  -
to some 250,000 farmers and being  the country's fourth  including  its implementation  at the national  and local
largest  source  of foreign  exchange.  This  trade was  levels,  the private  sector response  to renewed  trading
originally  developed  and organized  by private  traders (of  opportunities,  and the resultant patterns  of competition,
Indian and Arab origin),  although  in the 1960s a  price discovery,  and marketing  channel formation.
multitiered  marketing  system  - involving  local  The liberalization  experience  in Tanzania's  cashew  n
cooperative  societies,  regional  cooperative  unions, and a  industry  offers  interesting  insights  for other Sub-Saharan
marketing  board - was imposed,  with private  traders  African  countries  where uncertainty  remains  about the
gradually  removed  from the marketing  system.  appropriate roles (if any)  for marketing  boards in
Despite  a buoyant international  market, Tanzania's  liberalized  markets,  about the ability  of cooperatives  to
cashew  nut industry  underwent a steady and massive  compete  in such markets,  and about the ability  of
decline  through the 1970s and 1980s.  Jaffee examines  indigenous  firms  to take advantage  of the new trading
the factors  that contributed  to this downward  spin:  opportunities.
Tanzania's  villagization  program,  a decline  in real  In Tanzania,  neither  the cooperatives  nor the
producer prices, and inefficiencies  in cooperative  and  marketing  board have fared  well in the liberalized
marketing  board crop collection  and downstream  market. Although  a relatively  large  number  of private
activities.  With the decline  in production, living  traders have  recently entered into cashew  buying  and
standards  in the main cashew-growing  regions  worsened,  selling,  successful  entry into export marketing  has prov
and most of the large-scale,  donor-funded,  government-  viable  only  for a small  number  of companies.  Their
owned processing  factories  became  "white elephants."  characteristics:  medium  to large in scale,  diversified
With the industry  on the brink of collapse,  in 1991 the  across  commodities,  involved  in trading and
government  announced  the liberalization  of the cashew  agroindustry,  not indigenous,  and with strong  financial
nut market, permitting  private  firms  to once again  buy  and trading links abroad.
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a larger effort in the department  to assess  the division  of responsibilities  between  the public and the private sector
providing  agricultural  services  and agricultural  marketing  activities.  Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World
Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Cicely  Spooner, room N8-041, extension  32116 (42
pages).  March 1994.
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In the period  between World  War 11  and the early 1970s,  Tanzania  developed  one of the world's
largest cashew nut industries,  accounting  for some 30% of total world production  and ranking  among  the
leading exporters. Cashews  became  one of Tanzania's largest sources af foreign exchange  and provided
an important  source of income  for some 250,000 smallholder  farmers. Tanzania's cashew nut trade was
intitially developed by private traders, although during the 1960s a multi-tiered marketing system-
featuring local cooperative  societies, regional cooperative  unions, and a national marketing  board-was
imposed, with the role of private traders being marginalized  and eventually  renmoved  entirely.
As analyzed by Ellis (1979,1980,1982),  this multi-tiered  marketing system failed to operate
efficiently. Rising marketing costs, together with declining real producer prices, and  the forced
villagization  of smallholder  farmers greatly undermined  tLe incentives  to produce  cashew nuts. From the
mid-1970s  the industry  underwent  a steady  and dramatic  decline. By the late 1980s,  marketed  cashew  nut
production was only 15% of its level from the early 1970s, with most of the government's large-scale
processing factories lying idle and with Tanzania's reputation  for a high quality product badly damaged.
With the industry on the brink of complete  collapse, the Tanzanian Government  announced  in
1991 that the cashew nut market would be liberalized, with private firms permitted once again to
undertake trade. The liberalization  of the cashew nut market was viewed as somewhat  of a 'test case',
the results of which would influenced  the speed and nature of institutional  reforms in the processing  and
marketing  of Tanzania's other major industrial crops, including  coffee, cotton, and tobacco.
This paper  examines  the liberalization  process within  Tanzania's  cashew  nut industry  over the  past
two years, placing particular emphasis  on the nature of the private sector response to market reforms.
What types of firms have been able to take advantage  of the market reforms? How has the re-entry of
private firms into the cashew trade affected the trade of cooperatives  and the Tanzania Cashew Nut
Marketing  Board, and the welfare of farmers? How competitive  is the liberalized  market and what factors
have constrained  the emergence  of a greater degree of competition?  What residual market controls  have
remained, either officially  o: unofficially?  To what extent has market liberalization  placed the industry
on a road to  recovery? The liberalization experience within Tanzania's cashew nut industry offers
interesting  insights for other sub-Saharan African countries where there remains uncertainty about the
appropriate  roles for marketing  boards  in liberalized  markets, about  the ability  of cooperatives  to compete
in such markets, and about the ability of  indigenous firms to  take advantage of the new trading
opportunities.
This  paper is comprised of  four sections. Section I  examines important techno-economic
characteristics  of cashew  nuts (and their production  and processing),  noting  possible implications  for the
organization  of cashew  nut processing  and marketing.  Section  1I reviews the world market situation for
cashew nuts and the changing  position  of Tanzania and other sub-Saharan  countries  therein. Section  III
traces the rise and decline of Tanzania's cashew nut industry from the early 1930s  until 1990. Section
IV then examines  the process of market liberalization  which has taken place since 1991, emphasizing  the
nature and effectiveness  of the private sector response.
r. Cashew  Nuts:  'Poor Man's Crop and Rich Man's Food
The cashew  (Anacardium  occidntale  L.) belongs  to the Anacardiaceae  family  of plants which  also
includes  the mango, the pistachio nut, and the noxious  poison ivy, poison oak, and poison sumac. 47 The
47  The English  word 'cashew' is derived from the Portuguese  'caju', which in turn came from the Tupi-Indian
'acuji'. This section of the case study is based on FAO (1969), Northwood  and Kayumbo  (1970), Rosengarten
(1975), and Ohler (1979).I  0'.  2
cashew  tree is an evergreen  perennial  found  in many  tropical  areas. Native  to northeast  Brazil, the cashew
was taken, in the 16th Century, by Portuguese  colonists  and missionaries  to East Africa and Goa (ndia)
where it thrived. The cashew  has since spread to several dozen  countries,  primarily  between latitudes 15
degrees North and South. Under favorable  conditions,  the tree can grow to a height of 40 - 50 feet.
While also used for shading and for anti-soil erosion purposes, the cashew tree is most valued
for its fruit. The fruit is unusual in that it has two cornected parts. One part is a fleshy, pear-shaped
stalk, known as the 'cashew apple'. This apple is juicy and thin-skinned, from two to four inches in
length. The second part of the fruit is a kidney-shaped  nut, one to one and one-half inches  long. The nut
shell is smooth and oily and contains a toxic, resinous material. Contained within the nut is a white
kernel- the cashew nut which is eaten- approximately  seven-eighths  of an inch in length.
While the cashew  nut kernel is frequently  the focus  of commercial  activities,  various components
of the cashew fruit as well as the cashew  tree itself can be regarded as industrial raw materials. In this
regard, the cashew  is similar to the coconut  tree. Although  having  an astringent  taste when eaten directly,
the 'cashew apple' has multiple  potential uses, as in juices, jams, syrups, and alcoholic  beverages. Tle
vitamin C content of the 'apple' is several times that of citrus fruits. The toxic liquid found in the nut
shell, known  as cashew nut shell liquid (CNSL),  has been used in tropical  medicines  and has had various
industrial  applications  (e.g. as a frictton-modifying  material  in brake linings  and as an ingredient  in paints
and varnishes). The cashew nut shell can be ground into a powder for use as an ingredient  in building
materials and in anti-pest  substances.  The cashew  tree itself provides excellent  raw material for charcoal
production  and for the construction  of wood  boxes. The discussion  below focuses  attention  on the cashew
nut (and kernel), as these are the dominant  commercial  products within  Tanzania's industry.
Cashew  nuts (and kernels)  have certain properties  which may influence  the organization  of their
trade. For example,  they are characterized  by:
1) low perishability:  as long as the nuts are properly dried immediately  after harvest (to a
moisture content of less than 8%), they can be stored without  significant  loss of quality for up to one
year. 2 This implies that production  and subsequent  processing  operations  need not be tightly coordinated
with one another as processors  can conceivably  maintain  stocks  of nuts to guarantee  even throughput  into
their factories. Post-harvest  drying involves  a simple technique  of placing the nuts on bamboo  or metal
sheets  under the sun. Hence, unless the  harvest period  coincides  with precipitation  or very high humidity,
there is no technical requirement  for a rapid collection  of the crop from farmers. Cashews  can be stored
in heaps or in bags and do not have special storage requirements.  The kernels also have a long shelf-life
as long as they are stored in air-tight  containers  or other forms of packaging. 3
2) bulkiness of the raw material: although  cashew  nut kernals  are a very high value commodity
(see below), the kernel makes  up only 20-30%  of the weight  of the harvested  raw nut. Given the presence
of foreign matter, empty shells, and diseases/deformed  nuts, the actual yield of kernal material from raw
nuts is generally  only 18-23%. Unless  other by-products  are to be used (e.g. CNSL, shell powder), the
transport of raw nuts will involve movement  of much wasted material. This indicates  potentially  large
cost savings  by located  processing facilities  in close vicinity to major production  areas.
2 Nuts which are not properly dried will develop  mould or bacteria  or experience  irreversible  damage to the
kernel as a result of enzyme action.
3 In contrast, the 'cashew apple' is highly perishable  and must be processed  within  24 hours after being picked.
23) wide quality variability in the raw nuts and kernels: as a result of genetic, agro-climatic,
and other factors, there are significant differences in the size and shape of raw nuts, in their shell
thickness, and in the proportion of kernel material contained therein. This variation occurs betwee.n
locationm,  trees, and even on the same tree. The quality (and size) of the kernel cannot be judged by the
outward appearance of the nut, except when there is clear evidence  of disease or deformities. Even
though kernel size/quality  is not necessarily linked  to raw nut size and color, these crude indicators  are
frequently used to  determine grades. Only by doing a  "cutting test" (on a sample of nuts) can a
trader/processor  detect the true quality  of the nut. There  is thus a likelihood  for conflict and uncertainty
over grading.
Wide quality variability also occurs for kernels. Major distinctions are between 'wholes' and
'brokens',  between 'white'  and  'scorched',  and between different sizes of  kernels.  There exist
international  quality standards which provide the vocabulary for international  trade. Very large price
differentials  exist between the different  grades of whole and broken cashew kernels. It is the production
and proper grading cf high standard kernels which separates profitable from unprofitable  processing
operations.
The production and processing of cashew nuts have several characteristics  which might also
influence  organizational  patterns. For example:
4) cashews are  tolerant to  varied or marginal soil and  climatic conditions: due to their
extensive  root system, cashew trees can grow in areas with relatively poor soils and with relatively low
rainfall. As long as there is a distinct dry period of two to four months, cashews can set fruit where
rainfall  is as limited  as 40 inches  per year. Cashew  can grow on poor or stony soils, although  best results
are obtained on well-drained  sandy loam soils. These drought- and otherwise-resiliant  properties of
cashew  has frequently  led to its cultivation  in relatively  low potential  areas  where few other crops  provide
an economic  return. Partly as a result, cashew yields  are generally well below their genetic  potential.
5) cashew production features relatively low entry costs and little intensity of cultivation or
maintenance: cashews  can develop  wildly  through natural cross-pollination,  but are otherwise  generally
cultivated  from selected  or unselected  seeds, rather than from purchased  seedlings.  Unless planted on a
large scale, entry costs are thus minimal. The fact that cashews  can be intercropped  with other crops (at
least until the development  of the tree canopy), does not 'lock-in' the farmer into long-term monocrop
cultivation  of cashews. Few, if any, specialized  production inputs are required for cashew cultivation,
unless  to combat  a fungus/disease/pest  which emerges.  Tree maintenance,  involving  weeding  and pruning,
is less demanding than for most other tree crops. Depending  upon genetics and local conditions, the
cashew will normally yield a commercially  worthwhile crop by the third or fourth years and reach
premium yields by the eighth to tenth year. The cashew appears to have a very long productive life (of
30 years or more), although it is possible that yields decline  after twenty years.
6) cashews hasve  a seasonal and uneven yielding pattern: cashew  trees yield mature fruit (and
nuts) during a distinct season, lasting some three to four months. Effective storage is thus critical for
continuous  utilization  of processing facilities.  If the 'apple' is not being  used, the grower can wait for the
fruit to drop to the ground, this signifying  its maturity. One problem is that the yielding pattern is very
uneven  with small quantities  maturing  initially, building  up to larger quantities,  and then smaller  amounts
again. Under humid conditions  or where harvesting coincides with precipitation  (as in Tanzania), the
harvesting must be very regular. The uneven and uncertain  yielding pattern creates barriers to efficient
use of hired labor for this task. This, together with features (4) and (5) above partly explain the
dominance  of smallholder  cultivation  with family labor for cashews  (e.g. the 'poor man's crop).
37) cashew nut processing is a complicated process not amenable to on-farm activity: Cashew
nut processing  is more costly  and difficult  compared  with that for other  dessert nuts. The cashew  nut shell
is more difficult to break and requires .onditioning, via humidification  and roasting, before the kernel
can be removed  through decortication.  This problem is exacerbated  by the presence  of the toxic, sulphur-
containing  CNSL. Physical contact  with CNSL ca  result in severe burns or dermititis. Care must also
be taken to prevent the CNSL from coming into contact  with the kernel and therefore contaminating  it.
Cashew  nut processing thus requires some technical skill and careful management.  The multiple  stages
involved  in cashew nut processing are illustrated  in Figure 1 below.
8) there are a range of technologies available for cashew nut processing: 4 traditionally,  the
various functions of cashew nut processing were performed manually, using semi-skilled  experienced
workers. This remains the situation in India, the world's largest producer of cashew nut kernels. Since
the 1960's, however, various mechanized  processes and equipment  have been introduced in several
countries, most particularly for roasting, CSNL extraction, and decortication  (deshelling).  For the most
part, raw material cleaning and sizing and kernel grading have remained very labor-intensive  manual
operations.  Between  the Indian, largely  manual  technology  and the  various types of melium-to-4arge-scale
mechanical  and semi-mechanical  operations,  there are significant  differences  in investment  requirements,
labor skills (and health) requirements,  and levels of efficiency.  In general, the Indian processing  system
involves lower investment and variable costs and achieves far greater efficiency in terms of kernel
material yield and the proportion of whole kernels. That system does, however, require large numbers
of experienced  workers who work with unhealthy exposure to the CNSL. The mechanized  systems  are
more vulnerable to breakdown (due to shortages of spare parts, lubricating oils, etc.), require large
quantities  of nuts for efficient  operations', and operate well below manufacturer  specifications  wherever
strict grading and sizing activities  are not in place prior to the decortication  process.
H. The  World  Market  Situation  for  Cashew  Nuts
International  trade in cashew  nuts began  from India after World  War I. Following  the introduction
in the 1920s of improved packaging for long-distance  transit, the trade expanded rapidly, especially
between India and the United States. By World War II, cashew nuts had become the second most
important traded dessert nut (after almonds). They have remained in this position for the past half
century.
Although also consumed  in the country's of production, the cashew nut is widely  regarded as a
luxury snack food, chiefly destined for markets in countries with above average per capita incomes.
Cashew  nuts are the most expensive  of the major  dessert nuts, with a unit value typically  40% higher than
that of almonds  and three times that of all nuts as a group. 6 Some 90% of cashews  are eaten out-of-hand,
in contrast  to the pattern for other nuts which are more commonly  ground down into paste or used for
confectionary  purposes. This explains the very large price differentials  between 'whole' and 'broken'
cashews  and among 'whole' nuts of different sizes.
4 The technologies  of cashew nut processing  are examined  in FAO (1969) and in Ohler (1979, p.201-13).
5 Most of the major manufacturers  have produced  systems  with a rated capacity  of more than 3000 tons/year.
There are, however, a few manufacturers  whose systems  have rated capacities of 500 tons/year or less. It is the
larger systems  which have been put in place in Tanzania  and Mozambique.
6 Only macademia  nuts are more expensive  than cashew  nuts.
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Figure  1World Production TrnUds
World production of cashew nuts grew rapidly during the 1950s  and 1960s,  reaching a peak of
510,000 tons (of raw nuts) in 1974.7  Three countries--India,  Mozainbique,  and Tanzania-accounted  for
the bulk of such production, although  smaller  industries  had alco developed  in Brazil, Kenya, and several
other African countries. Beginning  in 1975, however, and continuing  through the mid-1980s,  there was
a  sharp fall in  world production, contributing to  a very  tight international market. While Indian
production was stagnant, the global fall can pi'marily be attributed  to the huge decline of production in
Mozambique  and Tanzania. There bas been some recovery in world production  since  the mid-1980s,  due
primarily  to a significant  expansion  in Brazilian  production.  Table 1 summarizes  major patterns in world
production over the past two decades.
Table 1: World and Country Cashew Nut Production, 1969/71 to 1989/91
Country/Region  Average Annual Production  Share of World Production
l________  (000 Tons)  (%)
1969-71  1979-81  1989-91  1969-71  l  1979-81  1989-91
India  175.7  159.0  140.0  33.8  36.2  28.1
Brazil  24.1  71.3  145.5  4.6  16.2  29.2
Africa  311.1  174.9  140.4  59.9  39.8  28.2
Mozambique  180.0  69.4  44.7
Tanzania  108.4  54.2  27.0
Kenya  16.2  15.8  11.5
Nigeria  N.A.  25.0  25.0
Guinea  Bissau  2.4  3.8  19.0
Others*
l  ____________  5.0  6.7  13.2  _  _
World  519.5  439.7  497.9  100.0  100.0  100.0
*Including  Cote Ivoire, Madagascar,  Angola, Benin, Togo, Mali, and Zambia
Source: FAO Production  Yearbooks
The table indicates that the share of sub-Saharan Africa in world production decreased from
nearly 60% in 1969-71  to only 28% in 1989-91.  A small recent expansion  in West African production
has not compensated  for the extreme  decline in Mozambique's  and Tanzania's production levels. While
in  1969-71  Brazil's production was only 8% that of sub-Saharan  Africa, by 1989-91  Brazil's output
exceeded  than of the African continent.
7 Gill and Duffus Edible Nut Market Reports, various years.
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high nutritional properties, the 'apple' is used primarily  to make alcoholic  beverages. In contrast, both
in India and Brazil the 'apple' is widely used, contributing  to increased farmer incomes  and increased
employment  and value-added  in Industry.  In India, a carbonated  beverage and several types of alcoholic
drinks are made from the 'apple'; in Brazil, a wider Industry  has developed  which uses the 'apple' to
produce  juices, jams, chutneys,  etc.
World Trade Trends
Cashews are one of the many varieties  of edible nuts traded worldwide. World trade in edible
nuts has experienced  relatively rapid growth, averaging about 2.7% per year since the early 1970s  and
increasing in value from $1.94 in  1980 to  $2.84 billion in  1990.9  Only seven varieties of nuts-
groundnuts,  a  nonds, cashews,  brazil nuts, desiccated  coconut,  hazelnuts, and walnuts-account  for 90%
of international  trade in edible nuts. While international  trade in CNSL  is not insignificant,  the discussion
here focuses  on trade in raw cashew  nuts and kernels.
International  trade in raw cashew nuts has traditionally  involved  shipments  from East Africa to
India. India was the first country  to build up a processing  industry. Domestic  production  has been  unable
to  meet the requirements of that country's hundreds of small-to-medium-scale  factories. State-level
restrictions on  internal movements of  cashew nuts further constrained raw material supplies and
necessitated  imports from the emerging  East African  industries  during the 1950s  and 1960s.  Peak levels
of Indian raw nut imports  were reached in the early 1970s  at levels exceeding  175,000  tons per year. The
imports, generally  concentrated  over the December  to May  period, complemented  the local harvest  which
begins in May and continues until July. Indian processors  could thus operate over an extended period
without  having to maintain very large stocks of raw nuts.
This trade subsequently  declined as a result of reduced production in East Africa and periodic
constraints  on access to foreign exchange  by Indian importers. Raw nut imports  fell to as low as 20,000
to 30,000 tons/year  during the early 1980s.  Since  then, import  levels  have increased  due to greater supply
availability,  particularly from Southeast  Asia. For example, in the first six months of 1992, imports
totalled over 80,000 tons, with largest supplies coming  from Vietnam, Indonesia,  and Tanzania." 0 While
Tanzania  once obtained  premium  prices over those of other suppliers, this has not generally  been the case
in recent years due to growing uncertainty  about  the quality of Tanzanian  shipments." 1
World trade ir. cashew  kernels is far better documented  than is the trade in raw nuts. According
to Gill and Duffus, world imports in 1990  totalled over $500 million, ranking cashews  second (behind
almonds)  among dessert nuts. India has long been the world's largest supplier of kernels with its prices
and quality setting the benchmarks  or standards  for the industry. At least in Europe, India has been the
preferred supplier, with long-standing  trading relationships  based on confidence  in product quality and
on fast and regular deliveries. India has more than 150 cashew kernel shippers, many of which have
offices  in the United States and Europe.
sRosengarten  (1975)  claims  that  95%  of cashew  apple  production  is wasted  world-wide.
9 Such figures  are for world exports as reported  in United  Nations, Yearbook  of International  Trade Statistics.
'°The Cashew,  October-December  1992  (Indian  trade  magazine).
"As  reported by international  cashew brokers and as indicated  in the Indian import data.
8Through the early 1970s, Mozambique  was also a major exporter. Its decline  has been paralleled
by a major expansion  in Brazilian  exports. While Brazil doesn't obtain  the technical  results which  prevail
in India's manual processing system, it has been competitive  in the U.S.  market due to  its lower
transportation costs and the unique larger-sized variety of the nut produced there. Other suppliers,
including  Tanzania, Kenya, and China  have a reputation  for irregular quality, contributing  to substantial
price discounts in international  markets (of 25-30%). Table 2 traces the levels of kernel exports by the
leading suppliers, while Table 3 illustrates  the substantial  price premium  obtained by Indian suppliers.
Table 2: Exports of Cashew Kernels by Major Producers
('000  Tons)  _
Country  1975  1980  1985  1988-90  (Ave.)
India  58.0  37.4  31.6  34.9
Mozambique  24.4  17.1  2.5  3.2
Brazil  7.6  11.9  25.0  21.7
Tanzania  4.0  5.5  0.5  1.4
Kenya  0.0  2.7  1.9  0.5
Source:  Gill  and Duffuis,  Edible  Nut  Market  Reports,  various  years.
Table 3: Price Comparisons of Major Cashew Kernel Suppliers
(United States  Import Values (FOB) All Grades; 1989-90  Averages)
Country  Quantity  Unit Value  % of Indian  Comments
C(ons)  ($/Ton)  Price
India  19,833  4835  100  Manual  Processing;
_High  Quality
Brazil  19,429  4205  87  Mechanical  Processing;
___________  _Medium  Quality
Mozambique  2,845  3577  74  Mechanical  Processing;
Low Quality
Tanzania  1,332  3673  76  Mechanical  Processing;
Low Quality
China  744  3568  74  Manual  Processing;
Low Quality
Kenya  403  3262  68  Mechanical  Processing;
Low Quality
Source: Agriconsult/AMEC  (1992)
9On the import side, the United States is by far the largest single market, accounting  for
more than 50%  of world imports. The bulk of such imports are eventually  marketed  as a snack
food under three main brand names--Planters,  Eagle Snacks, and Fisher. Cashews are the only
major dessert nut for which U.S. domestic production is negligible  and the U.S.  is in fact a
major exporter of almonds, walnuts, hazelnuts, and other varieties. As Table 4 indicates, the
other major import markets include Japan, Australia, Canada, the former USSR, and several
EEC countries. With the major exception of the former USSR (which had previously been a
large importer of lower quality nuts for confectionery  use), import levels increased in these
major markets during the 1980s.
Table 4: Cashew Nut Kernel Inports  into Major Markets
(000 Tons)  l
Country  1980-82  Average  1984-86  Average  1989-91  Average
United States  30,917  43,073  48,372
(Former) USSR  20,816  3302  3328
Netherlands  3080  2301  3669
Germany  2796  2736  3661
Canada  2666  3235  4309
United Kingdom  2638  2934  4919
Japan  2371  2717  4520
Australia  1535  3011  2930
Sub-Total  66,819  63,309  75,708
Source: Gill and Duffus Edible Nut Market Report, various issues.
Long-term  trends in international  prices  in kernels  are shown  in Graph 1 below. The data
refer to U.S. CIF prices per ton for benchmark  size 320 whole  kernels. Current  prices have  been
deflated by the G-5 MUV index to obtain real prices. The graph shows that since the early
1970's, sharp increases in (nominal  and real) prices were recorded during three periods--1976
to 1977, 1979 to 1982, and 1984 to 1987. Through most of the 1980s, real prices were higher
than those which prevailed during the early 1970s.
10Graph 1: International  Prices for Cashew Nut Kernels
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MII.  The Rise and Decline of Tanzania's  Cashew Nut Industry
Cashew  nut production  and  trade has long  played  an important  role in the Tanzania  economy.
Over much of the period since the early 1960s, cashews  have been Tanzania's fourth largest source of
foreign exchange, following coffee, cotton, and sisal. Cashews are grown by more than 250,000
smallholder  farmers. Although  grown throughout  the coastal area, cashew nuts have long been the most
important  source of farm incomes in the southern regions of Mtwara, Lindi, and Ruvuma. The decline
of the industry has had a strong adverse effect on living standards in these regions.
The Cashew was probably introduced  into Tanzania  from Mozambique  in the 16th Century  and
was initially  used to check  soil erosion in the coastal areas. Cashew  groves developed  naturally  and there
is no evidence  of any specialized  production  or commercial  trade of the crop prior to this century. This
section traces the early development  and subsequent decline of the Tanzanian industry through four
periods, namely:
1) 1930s  to 1962  - Private Merchants  and the Development  of Trade
2) 1962 to 1974  - Expansion  and Multi-Tiered  Marketing  System
3) 1974  to 1985  - Industrialization  and Production  Decline
4) 1985 to 1991  - Reversing  the Downward  Slide
In the subsequent  section, the recent process of market liberalization  is examined.
11PiYvate  Merchants  and the Development  of Trade (1930s  to 1962)
A commercial  cashew  nut trade  did not develop  until the 1930s,  when  plantings  on Mafia  Island
and on sisal estates in Tanga yielded  an export  crop of 210 tons in 1938.12  This,trade  was interrupted
during  World  War II, but immediately  afterwards  there was an expansion  in plantings,  especially  in the
Mtwara  and  Ruvuna Regions  in the southerp  zone  (see  map in the Appendix).  Both  production  and trade
grew steadily,  the rapid progression  of exports  being illustrated  in Graph  2. This trade was entirely  in
raw nuts, sent to India  for processing.  An attempt  in the early 1950s  to develop  a small-scale  processing
operation  at Mtwara  was  unsuccessfil  due to the instability  in the available  labor force.
While  there were some  cashew  plantings  on estates,  including  on lands leased  by the Tanganyika
Agricultural  Corporation  (famous  for the failed  groundnut  scheme),  most of the expanding  production
took place on smallholdings.  Cashews  fit into the traditional  cropping  system, with trees sometimes
planted  on land  previously  left fallow  after  cassava  was  harvested  or else  the  two crops  were  intercropped
until  the tree canopy  developed.  In parts of Newala  District,  the  high population  density  and  past intensive
cultivation  had impoverished  the soils  such that  only cashews  and cassava  provided  a reasonable  return.
A drought-resistant  tree, the cashew  has the unusual  ability  to flower  and set fruit during  the driest  part
of the year.  This proved  important  in southern  Tanzania  where  the  dry season  lasts  as long  as six  months.
These  early cashew  plantings  were encouraged  by private  traders (of Indian  and Arab origins)
who  operated  local shops  or transport  companies  and who  bought  or bartered  for the cashew  crop.  During
the October-February  harvest  season,  "buying  days' were announced  when  traders would  purchase  the
crop for cash.  Some two dozen  private  traders/shippers  stored  and exported  the crop out of Mtwara  port
to India, where  they built up long-term  trading  relations  with processors  and brokers.







llii1s  and the subseuent  paragraph are based on Northwood (1962) and Tanganyika Trade Joumnal  (1963).
12Expansion  and Multi-Tiered  Marketing  System  (1962  to 1974*
At independence  in 1962,  a Southern  Region  Cashew  Nut Board  was established  with  a mandate
to stabilize  prices and to develop cooperatives  in the region. 13 The Board was given  sole authority  to
purchase  the cashew  crop and to sell it to exporters  at auction.  The Board  divided  up the region  Into 11
procurement  zones, appolnting  a 'main buying  agent"  for each,  who in turn appointed  "primary  buying
agents"  to deal directly  with farmers.  Initially,  most  of these  buying agents  were the private merchants
already  active  in the trade.  However,  by 1963,  80%  of the crop in the Mtwara  and  Rumuva  Regions  was
handled  by primary  cooperative  societies  at the local level and newly-formed  cooperative  unions  at the
secondary  level. In that  same  year, the functions  of the SRCB  were taken  over the Southern  Agricultural
Products  Board. A year later, the latter would  be superceded  by the National  Agricultural  Products
Board. Thus began  the institutional  roller coaster  which  has plagued  the cashew  nut industry  up to the
present.
The multi-tiered  system  operated  satisfactorily  through  much  of the  mid-to-late  1960's, although
the official  producer  prices set by the government  were not adjusted  upward. While available  records
suggest  that both crop collection  and payments  to farmers  took  place on a timely  basis, the cooperatives
were apparently  not effective  in screening  product  quality.  For example,  in 1968  the NAPB lost large
quantities  of nuts due to improper  drying and grading  at the post-harvest  stage. In response  to this
problem,  the Board commandeered  the agricultural  staff assigned  to the southern  zone, using them as
cashew  nut collection  observers  and graders.
While the pace of new plantings  declined,  the maturation  of existing  shambas  contributed  to
continued  rapid growth in produdtion  and trade. Graph 3 traces the growth in marketed  production
through  to the early 1970s.  This production  peaked  at over 145,000  tons in 1973/74,  then accounting  for
nearly  30% of total world  production.













4019150Z  |  1986iS4  |  19V880  |19065/8  1  1SV70  1  1974/72  197iV74
1962  63  196465  1966/67  196869  1970/71  197V73
'3 This and  the subsequent  pamgraph  are based  on Northwood  and Kayumbo  (1970), Ohler (1979),  Annual
Reports  of Agriculture,  and an interview  with  former  cashew  researcher  A. Tsakaris.
13Smallholders  continued  to be the  backbone  of the expanding  industry.  One  survey  conducted  in
the mid-1960s  found  that 71% of cashew  farmers  had total  holdings  of less than  four acres, with the
majority  of farmers  owning  less than  fifty  trees." 4 In the survey  area (e.g. Lulindi  in Masasi  District)
approximately  25%  of the  total  land  area  was covered  by mature  cashew  trees,  with  cashews  accounting
for 78% of the total cash  income  of the farmers.  At this  time,  efforts  were  also  made  to expand  cashew
production  in the Tanga  Region  along  the coast in order to replace  cotton cultivation.  The official
agricultural  staff  provided  seedlings  and  technical  assistance  for this effort." 5 By 1972,  the Agricultural
Census  reported national  cashew  plantings  of 200,000 hectares, of which 139,000  hectares  were
monocrop  and  61,000  hectares  were intercropped  with  one or more  crops.
During  this  period,  a further  attempt  was  made  to develop  a cashew  processing  capacity  in order
to increase  value-added  and to reduce  the dependency  of the industry  on a single  market-that  of India
for raw  nuts. A government-sponsored  study  conducted  in 1962  argued  that  uncertainties  regarding  the
availability  of labor  in the south  and shortages  of skilled  labor  would  prevent  Tanzania  from following
the Indian  model  of manual  cashew  processing.  The study  recommended  that  the country  move  toward
mechanical  processing.' 6 In  1965, an Italian company, Oltremare  S.A.  set up Tanzania's first
mechanized  cashew  nut factory  in Dar es Salaam  with a 9000  ton raw nut capacity  (ater upgraded  to
12,500  tons)." 7 While  the factory  did  begin  to operate,  its kernel  exports  were not  profitable  due to the
generally  low  quality  of raw  nuts  found  in the  DSM  Reg.  nn. The factory's  non-profitability  also  stemmed
from  its comparatively  poor  yield  of kernal  material  per ton of raw  nuts. In 1968,  a second  mechanized
factory  was set up in Mtwara  by a Japanese  company  (Cashco).  The factory  had a 8000  ton capacity,
although  equipment  breakdowns  and  power  shortages  prevented  it from  operating  for several  years.  By
1973,  still  less  than 10%  of the cashew  crop  was processed  locally,  with raw  nut exports  remaining  the
dominant  trade.
Industrialization  and  Production  Decline  (1974  - 1985)
In 1973,  the Cashew  Authority  of Tanzania  was created  in order  to promote  the expansion  and
wider  development  of the cashew  nut industry.  CATA  would  take  over the crop buying  functions  of the
NAPB  and  by-pass  the former  exporters  by selling  the crop  to foreign  buyers  on a tender  basis. CATA's
mandate  was much  broader  however,  with  plans  outlined  for the establishment  of a cashew  extension  and
grading  service,  the development  of a cashew  research  program,  an investment  in a port storage  facility
for CSNL exports,  and for further  investments  in large-scale  cashew  processing  facilities.  With the
cooperative  unions  being  phased  out over the 1974-76  period,  CATA  would  procure  the crop directly
from village  societies  and  influence  the determination  of official,  pan-territorial  producer  prices.
2
In 1974,  one  of CATA's  main  objectives  was  pursued  with  the initiation  of a World  Bank-funded
project  to construct  five  cashew  processing  factories  with  a total  capacity  of 36,400.  The factories,  to be
located  in each of the main towns  in Mtwara  and Lindi Regions,  were to contain 'state-of-the-art'
(Oltremere)  equipment  for mechanical  processing.  While  factory  construction  proceeded  satisfactorily,
14TTsaris  (1967).
's Ministry  of Agriculture,  Annual  Report  1966.
'  Tanganyika  Industrial  Development  (1962),  p. 44-52.
7 This  was  by far  the  largest  cashew  processing  factory  in the  world  at that  time.
14the actual costs ended  up being several times the original estimate." As a result, the research component
of the project was dropped and large cutbacks  were made in technical  support services.
In  1976, with construction  of the new factories still taking place, the Tanzanian government
requested  a second phase to the World  Bank project. Concern  was expressed  about  the lack of operational
experience  in the earlier funded factories and about  the overall economic  viability  of additional  factories.
At the time, there was also some evidence of a decline in cashew nut production, although greater
reliance  was given  to CATA's  optomistic  projections  for future  production  levels. In any case, the second
phase project was approved,  involving  the construction  of three more factories with an additional  capacity
of 26,000 tons. Parallel bilateral financing for two additional  factories would bring the total processing
capacity  to 113,000  tons by 1980.
Before any of the new factories came on line, Tanzania's cashew  production  began to plummet.
From the 1973/74  peak of over 145,000  tons, marketed  production  fell quickly  to 84,000  tons in 1975/76
and then declined through the late 1970s  and early 1980s  to reach only 31,100 tons in 1982/83 (Graph
4). Thus, just as the new factories were being completed,  total national  production was only one-third
to one-fourth  of factory capacity.
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1s Actual costs were 3.6 times original  estimates.
15As analyzed  elsewhere,  several factors likely contributed  to this pattern. 19 One of these was the
"villagization' program whose implementation  in the southern zone began in mid-1974. This program
Involved  the forced re-location  of the rural population  into villages which were then given priority in the
allocation  of land and in the provision of social services.  In the south, one of the results of the program
was to separate smallholders  from their cashew shambas, sometimes  by considerable  distances. This,
together with new work responsibilities  in the  development  of the new villages and communal  plots,
prevented many farmers from harvesting cashews and from properly maintaining  these shambas. The
latter was probably an important  factor in the spread of a mildew disease  among  cashew trees in certain
locations and a subsequent  decline in yields.'
These logistical and technical problems were exacerbated  by the virtual collapse of support
services for cashew  at this time. With CATA focusing  on processing  and trading activities,  little research
work was done, extension  services  deteriorated, and no system was put into place to detect and monitor
farm-level  production  problems. 2"
Further undermining  production incentives  was a decline in the real producer prices of cashew
nuts, together with a decline  in cashew  prices relative  to those of other crops. This is illustrated  in Tables
5 and 6 below. Table 5 shows the decline and then stagnation of real producer prices from 1971/72
through to the early 1980s. The table also shows the substantial  decline in the producer's share of total
export revenues during the 1970s, reaching its nadir at 25-30% between 1978 and 1981. Cashew nut
producers did not benefit from the significant  increase in international  prices for raw nuts and kernals
which occurred from 1977  to 1982 and also did not capture any of the benefits associated with the shift
toward increased  local processing  which took place in the late 1970s  and early 1980s. 22
Ellis (1980) examined  trends in producer incentives  during this period, finding that increased
international  prices were absorbed by rapidly increasing  operating costs (especially  unit administrative
costs) on the part of CATA. Significant  increases in (real) producer prices were not implemented  until
the 1981/82  and subsequent  seasons, by which time world prices had fallen back somewhat.  The result
of these developments  was a temporary sharp increase in the producers' share of export values and a
corresponding  large trading loss recorded by CATA.
Table 6 shows that while the real prices for other crops also declined  over much of this period,
cashew nut producers were most adversely  affected  by government  price (and marketing)  policies.
'9 Ellis (1979, 1980). A detailed  analysis of crop  production  problems  did not feature  in the supervision  reports
of the World Bank project until 1980,  despite the critical importance  of these problenis for the economic  viability
of the Bank-funded investments. Instead, attention focused on  the progress of  factory construction and  on
management  problems  within the CATA.
X  Although  this mildew disease was first cited and diagnosed  in the 1960s, it apparently began to have an
important  negative effect on yields only by the late 1970s.
21 Research  was undertaken  only  after a bilateral  grant was  provided  by the Italian  government  became  effective
in 1979. Of the 344 extension assistants  recruited under the World Bank project, only 32 had prior training in
agriculture. The extension staff were largely involved in the procurement of raw nuts. In retrospect, it was
unrealistic  to expect the newly-created  CATA to be able to effectively  take on a wide range of marketing  and
support services all at one time.
2  Just the opposite  occurred  as delays  in processing  and CATA  losses in kernel exports  weakened  the financial
structure in the cashew nut industry  and resulted  in the emergence  of delayed payments  to farmers.
16Table 5: Producer Price Trends for Cashew Nuts, 1971/72 to 1983/84
Season  Nominal  Producer  Producer Price in  Producer Price as %
Price (rsh./Kg.)'  Constant 1971/72  of Export Unit
Tsh./Kg.  Values 2
1971/72  0.91  0.91  67.0%
1972/73  0.91  0.84  67.0%
1973/74  0.91  0.73  49.8%
1974/75  1.03  0.67  54.5%
1975/76  1.03  0.58  47.4
1976/77  1.07  0.55  36.5
1977/78  1.12  0.52  30.0%
1978/79  1.64  0.65  40.2%
1979/80  1.64  0.51  24.7%
1980/81  1.78  . 0.44  30.9%
1981/82  2.80  0.56  72.2%
1982/83  4.70  0.70  65.8%
1983/84  6.58  0.80  48.2%
1 Weighted  value, assuming  80% Standard  Grade and 20% Undergrade
2 Calculated  as producer price % average unit value of all cashew  export products (raw nuts,
kernels, CNSL) on a raw nut equivalent  basis. The methodology  is similar to that used by Ellis
(1979) except that the assumption  here is a 20% kernal material recovery  from the raw nut.
Sources: Calculated  from Data provided in Marketing  Development  Bureau, Annual Review  of
Cashewnuts,  various years.
By the mid-1970s, there was evidence of  farmers not only neglecting their cashew
shambas, but of displacing  cashew nuts with short-cycle  legumes,  such as cowpeas,  pigeon  peas,
and various beans. In some places, farmers began to fell cashew nut trees for use in charcoal
production.'  The government's response to such developments  included: 1) a campaign to
'teach'  fanners the importance  of maintaining  their shambas, 2) road blocks and the banning
of petty-trading  and charcoal-making  in the affected  areas, 3) and various types  of threats  against
producers who did not  harvest and sell  their cashew nuts.'  Such interventions were not
effective and production and trade levels continued to decline.
" Havnevik  (1979) reports on the situation  in Rufiji District.
24These efforts are discussed fiuther by Msangi et al. (1987).
17Table 6: Comparative  Trends In Produci6 Prices  During the 1970.
(% Increase or Decrease)
Crop  1969/70  1973/74  1973/74 - 1979/80
Nonminal  Real  Nominal  Real
Export  Crops  _  _
Cashew  0.0  -38.4  91.2  -24.0
Coffee  7.2  -33.9  _  104.7  -18.6
Cotton  3.8  -36.0  157.3  +2.3
Tobacco  29.1  -20.5  r  58.1  -37.1
Domestic Crops  i  _  __  _  _
Maize  17.9  -27.4  202.9  +20.4
Paddy  9.6  -32.5  163.2  +4.6
Groundnuts  25.0  -23.0  247.8  +38.3
Sunflower  31.0  -19.3  154.5  +1.2
Source: Eliis (1982)
Shortages of raw materials were one of the main factors undermining  the viability of the new
processing  factories. Even though more than half of the total production  was locally processed  between
1980  and 1982, this level of production  was insufficient  to operate more than a few of the factories.  Two
of the completed  factories were never operated, these lacking access to reliable sources of water and
power. Of the remaining  ten factories, only four operated in 1982/83  and only two operated during the
subsequent  two seasons.
Raw materials availability  was not the only problem. With poor grading of raw nuts and with
power and water interruptions, the quality of the finished product was uneven and generally below
international  standards. Tanzanian kernel exports thus brought price discounts of 35 to 50% from the
Indian price.2Y  Tbis, together with the favorable prices for raw nuts imported by India, resulted in the
Tanzanian factories accruing negative  value-added  in 1981  and 1982 and sustaining  continued  financial
losses.
Reversing  the Downward  Slide (1985-1991)
In 1985, CATA was replaced  by the Tanzania Cashew Nut Board and the cooperative  unions
were re-established.  Crop procurement  arrangements  would  henceforth resemble  those prevailing  during
the early 1970s, whereby primary cooperative  societies would procure the crop from farmers (paying
official  pan-territorial  prices for the two grades), using funds  supplied  by cooperative  unions. The unions
would in-turn transport the crop to the TCMB which would then either process the nuts or export them
5 Over  the 1981-83  pexiod.
18as raw nuts. An inter-store price %yas  negotiated  between the coopetive  unions and the TCMB,
ostensibly  geared  toward enabling  the unions  to recover  their  procurement  and wider  operating  costs.
At approximately  the same  time, the Second  Cashewnut  Development  Project  was restructured,
with the remaining  undisbursed  funds  going toward  a pilot program  of applied  research, extension  and
training.'  Under this program, the powdery mildew problem was investigated  and farmers were
encouraged  to dust their trees with sulphur  as a remedy.  Such  efforts were geared  toward  reversing  the
decline  in production  yields, thus stimulating  farmers  to harvest  their crop. In addition  to the technical
measures,  official  producer  prices were increased  in real terms  from the 1987/88  season  onward3"
Such  measures,  however,  were  overwhelmed  by inefficiencies  and graft in the marketing  system.
The  cooperative  unions,  iacking  strong  managerial  capabilities  and having  weak  accounting  systems,  were
not effective  in performing  their functions  and also built up huge arrears on their bank loans. 21  These
financial  problems  fed down through  the system  with cooperative  societies  being able to purchase  the
cashew crop only on an erratic basis and making  payments  to farmers  only after several months.' In
several  years, large  quantities  of nuts  remained  unsold  at the farm  or village  level at the end of the  buying
season.  Between  cooperative  societies  and  unions,  significant  quantities  of nuts 'leaked' out of the system.
A total  breakdown  in the system  of grading  also occurred,  with  more than  95% of nuts delivered  during
the late 1980s  being  classified  as standard  (e.g. first) grade. 3
Declining  marketed  production  and problematic  buying  agents  were important,  yet not the only
factors  constraining  the operations  of the TCMB  during this period. Foreign exchange  shortages  led to
shortages  in spare parts and oil to operate  the factories.  At the same  time, the factories  were required  to
make employees  permanent  after only three months of work. This greatly added to labor costs for
factories  which  operated  only 100  or fewer days  per year. Even  in the  procurement  of nuts, the factories
ran into  barriers set up by local authorities  who viewed  the factories  as local assets and thus sought  to
prevent local nuts being transported  to otier factories for processing.  Between 1985 and 1990, nine
factories  were  closed  entirely,  while  the three others  operated  only  intermittently.  The value added  from
processing  was either negadve  or too low to cover  processing  costs. Raw nut exports also plummeted,
reaching  below 7500 in 1989/90.31
Table  7 provides  various  indicators  of performance  for the industry  over the L984/85  to 1990/91
period, while Table 8 summarizes  the limited utilization  of Tanzania's large-scale,  state-of-the-art
processing  factories.
26This  was  the Cashew  Production  Improvement  Pilot  Project.
n  The  extent  to which farmers  realized  these  higher  prices  is not clear.  During  this  period,  local  cesses  (for
education,  building,  and other  fimds)  on cashew  nuts,  paid  either  by farmers  or by cooperative  societies,  were
increased  significantly.  One  thing  is clear,  however.  Farmers  benefitted  little  or none  from  the  large  international
price  increase  over  the 1986-88  period,  with  windfaU  profits  accruing  to the  TCMB.
23  This  analysis  is based  on Duncan  (1988)  and  cooperative  union  records.
29 Farmers  were also directed  taxed  to cover  for cooperative  union  losses  via excessive  deductions  for
'shrinkages'  between  the  farm-gate  and  cooperative  union  delivery  to the  TCMB.
30 Historically,  80-85%  of nuts  were  graded  as standard  grade.
31  During  this  period,  the  TCMB  began  to mix  nuts  from  different  locations,  completely  undermining  foreign
buyer  confidence  in Tanzania's  system  of grading  and  weakening  the  tender  systerm  Concerns  were  also  expressed
about  the  non-transparency  of the  tender  system,  with  the  possibility  of private  interests  overriding  public  interest.
19Table 7: Indicators  of Cashew  Nut Industry  Performance  1984/8S  - 1990/91
Indicator  1984/85  1985/86  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91
Marketed  32,073  18,956  16,544  24,374  19,275  17,059  29,325
Production
(Tons)  _  l
Producer  Price
(rsh./kg)
Nominal'  9.66  11.58  17.93  29.50  39.35  82.60  108.15
Constant  9.66  8.98  10.49  13.23  13.76  23.14  25.27
(84/85)  _1__  _  _
Producer  Price  71%  37%  25%  32%  38%  57%  56%
as % of Unit
Export Value 2 l
Cooperative  N.A.  94.63  84.14  95.94  131.34  135.64  332.24
Union  Losses
(Tsh.  Million)  _
TCMB  N.A.  N.A.  488  386  72  (493)  N.A.
Profits/(Losses)
(Tsh. Million)
Raw  Nut  13,853  13,379  13,871  14,004  7,485  7,429  19,000
Exports (Tons)5  _  _  __l
Kernel  Exports  518  0  0  1014  1711  1412  956
(rons)'
Processing  12%  N.A.  N.A.  -4%  -2%  12%  36%
Value  Added
(%)6  _  _  _  _  _  _
Factory  2.1%  0  0  4.1%  8.4%  12.9%  4.3%
Capacity
Utilization (%)'  ll
1 Weighted  Average,  95% standard  grade  and 5% undergrade.
2 Takes into account  exports of raw nuts, kernels,  and CNSL.
3 Aggregate  for Unions  for Lindi, Coast, Mtwara, and DSM Regions.
4 Aggregate  for (3) above  plus Tanga  Cooperative  Union.
5 For calender  year (e.g. 1985, 1986,  etc.)
6 Unit value of kernels and CNSL  over and above  raw nut export  value.
7 Utilization  rate for total national  capacity.
Sources:  Marketing  Development  Bureau,  Antnual  Report  of Cashewnuts,  various years.;
Unpublished  Cooperative  Audit report.
20Table 7: Operations of Cashew Nut Processing Factories
Factory  Date of  Source of  Est.  Annual  Rawnut  Throughput  (Tons)  Total # of Days Operated
Test Run  Finance  Maximum  Through Sept. 1991
Capacity
1985/  1986/  19871  1988/  1989/  1990/
___________  __________  86  87  88  89  90  91
Tanita  1965  GOT  10,700  0  0  218  2455  3000  1345  > 1000
Mtwara  1968  GOT + ES  6,800  0  0  0  0  0  0  ?_I
Lindi  1978  WB  8,600  0  0  0  0  0  0  301
Mbagala  1978  ES  10,700  0  0  0  0  0  0  ?
Mtamna  1979  WB  4,300  0  0  0  0  0  0  358
Likombe  1980  WB  8,600  0  0  2402  3144  6000  1473  >800
Kibaha  1980  WB  8,600  0  0  1383  2536  3500  1345  720
Nachingwea  1981  WB  4,300  0  0  0  0  0  0  95
Masasi  1981  WB  8,600  0  0  0  0  0  0  91
NewalaII  1981  WB  8,600  0  0  0  0  0  0  116
Tinduru  Never  ES  8,600  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Newala  I  Never  WB  8,600  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Sources: Agriconsult/Amec  (1992); MDB Annual Cashewnut  Report,  various years.
21IV. Market  Liberalization  and Private  Sector Response  (1991- Present)
As part of a Structural  Adjustment  Programme  begun in 1983, the Tanzanian  government  began
to liberalize  the domestic  marketing  of grains and other food crops, moving  away  from the official  single
channel systems put in place in the mid-1960s. Private traders, which in any case had been active in
parallel market trading, were first permitted to condluct  trade across regional boundaries. Quantity
restrictions were later relaxed and removed altogether. By 1988/89, private traders were allowed to
purchase crops from primary societies and by 1990  all restrictions were lifted.
In the southern regions where cashews are the major cash crop, private traders successfully
competed  with cooperatives  in the procurement  of the liberalized  crops. In general, private traders paid
higher prices and paid cash, so farmers did not experience the same payment delays as with the
cooperatives. 32 Private merchants  were particulasly  active in the trades in sesame  and cassava  roots, for
which sizable export markets  have been developed. An illustration  of the emerging  major role of private
traders in southern zone food marketing  is provided  in Table 8 which provides  survey data from the East
Makonde area concerning  farmer market outlets for different crops. As the Table indicates, during the
1990/91  season only for cashew  nuts did the cooperative  societies continue  to play a major role.
Table 8: Proportion of Sales Transactions  by Buyer and Crop in E. Makonde  Plateau
(Percentage;  1990/91 Season)
Crop  Primary Society  Private Trader  Consumer
Cashew  100  0  0
Cassava  25  48  27
Sesame  25  75  0
Groundnuts  0  31  69
Pulses  10  31  59
Cereals  7  43  50
Source: ODA Cashew  Research  Project. Household  Agricultural  Marketing  Survey.
While domestic markets were liberalized, the marketing  of traditional export crops remained
confined  to one channel,  multi-tiered  systems.  Initial  proposals  to liberalize  the cashew  nut trading  system
were put forward in the late 1980s  under the CPIPP. However, it was not until the 1990 Tanzania
Agricultural  Adjustment  Programme that the government announced  its intention  to implement  major
policy and institutional  changes  in export crop marketing.  This commitment  was put in concrete  form in
Tanzania's Policy Framework Paper, presented  by the government  in April 1991.
The cashew  nut industry  would  play the lead role in export crop market  liberalization,  beginning
with the 1991/92  season. This industry  was chosen, in part due to the relative weak-ness  of its cooperative
unions (compared  with those in the cotton and coffee industries),  but also because  the industry  was in the
32 ODA Cashew  Research Project, Household  Agricultural  Marketing  Survey,  op cit.
22gravest shape. A survey conducted  during the 1990/91  season had found that, depending  upon location,
some one-third  to one-half  of farmers  with cashew  shambas  were not harvesting  nuts (see Table 9). Even
those who did harvest faced severe sales problems. By July 1991 (some two to three months after the
expected  end of the buying season), still 30% of the crop had not been purchased  due to cash shortages.
The government needed to intervene  with the banks to clear the crop. Especially in the southern zone,
where, depending  upon location,  cashew  nut sales account  for between  36% and 80% of total farmer crop
incomes, the decline in production  and the inefficiencies  in marketing  were contributing  to  'ignificant
decline in living standards. At the same time, the government's huge investment  in processing facilities
was bringing  minimum  return, with most factories  lying idle.
Table 9: Importance of Cashews and Cashew Sales in Tanzania's Southern Zone
Area  %  of  Of Those  Of Those  Of Those  Mean  Mean  Cashew
Households  with  With  With  Cashew  Total  Sales as
with  Cashews, %  Cashew  Cashes  Income  Income  % of
Cashews  Harvesting  in  % Sold  % Use  (Tsh.)  from Crop  Total
90/91 Season  Cashews  Cashews  Sales  Crop
l  __________  ___________  ________  for Food  (Tsh)  Sales
E.Makonde  70  64.  59  40  7436  12630  59
W.Makonde  96  83  75  80  24319  28988  84
S.Masasi  73  77  73  67  13531  21804  62
Tinduru  81  44  40  35  6880  19007  36
Lindi/Nach./  73  60  53  45  6218  10244  61
NEMasasi  l
Coastal Plain  75  65  61  29  7473  10937  68
Source:  ODA  Cashew  Research  Project,  Ai cultural  Marketin  Suwvey  X1991
The government's original intension was that the TCMB would retain a monopoly  on export
marketing,  yet primary marketing  would  be liberalized.  The Ministry  of Agriculture  issued its guidelines
in July 1991, leaving only three months for preparation  before the beginning  of the marketing  season.
These guidelines  were vague and were announced  only through the media (e.g. radio and newspapers),
with no official  documentation  being sent to the regional and district authorities  who would  be responsible
for  implementing  and monitoring  the structural  changes.  Local authorities  thus were given  no explanation
of the rationale  behind  the policy changes  and were largely unaware  of the structural changes  envisioned
within  the marketing  system. Implementation  of the guidelines  was seemingly  left  at the discretion  of local
authorities.
This weak communication,  combined  with the conservative  attitude  of some local authorities  and
the vested interests of the cooperatives,  caused  a delay in the registration  of private cashew traders and
resulted in ad hoc procedures for doing so. In some regions, local officials viewed would-be private
traders not as competitors  with the cooperatives,  but as supplementary  actors in the procurement  of the
23crop. Restrictions were placed on the locations where the private traders could operate and on the
quantities  which they could purchase. They were required to pay official  prices and to submit weekly
sales returns to local authorities. The registration  process was interpreted  by some regional authorities
as a fund-raising  exercise, with significant  licensing fees being cha ged.3 Initially, private traders were
required to sell the crop to TCMB. They argued that without  the right to export (and retain FOREX),
there was little incentive  to participate.  Only in April 1992, however, did the TCMB concede  to the right
of private firms (and cooperatives)  to export cashew  nuts on their own accounts.
As a result of the uncertainties and official  barriers, very few private traders were registered
through  December. By February, there were still only thirty-one  registered  traders, the majority  of which
were in Lindi (15) and Mtwara (10). In Coast and Tanga Regions, local authorities  sought to protect the
regional  cooperative  unions  by greatly limiting  the number  of registered  private traders. Only in the Lindi
Region did private traders play a major role in the procurement  of the 1991/92 crop. The regional
cooperative  union, LIRECU, was declared insolvent  prior to the season and was thus unable to obtain
a bank overdraft  to procure cashews.  Only late in the season did the TCMB provide  LIRECU with funds
in order to buy the crop in poorly accessible  areas where the private traders had not ventured. Thus, in
Lindi, private traders accounted  for 77% of the purchased  crop. Nation-wide,  the share of private traders
was only 17.5% during the first season of 'liberalization'.
With pre-determined  official  prices and fixed margins, and with official efforts to segregate  the
buying operations  of cooperatives  and private traders, no real competition  emerged during this season.
Tme  only major distinction  occurred with regard to grading. In contrast with the cooperatives,  grading
was taken seriously by private traders. As a result, nearly 30% of the nuts purchased in Lindi were
downgraded  to undergrade (UG). 3'  In contrast, in neighboring  Mtwara Region, the cooperative  union
(MARCU)  purchased  nearly 10,000 tons of nuts, only two tons of which were classified as UG.
Several private firms did try to export part of the 1991/92 crop. The results were generally
disastrous.'  Having procured much of their crop relatively late in the season, the firms had acquired
stocks of mixed quality. Being granted the right to export only in April, the private exporters  were in a
position to sell their crop only after the Indian domestic season had begun. As a result of these two
factors, Indian buyers offered relatively low prices which several exporters rejected. These firms
subsequently  had to unload their stocks at even lower prices during the subsequent  season.3'
A few cooperative unions also sought to directly export their crop. They too ran into severe
difficulties  related to product quality and experienced  several cancellations  in sales contracts. Shipments
which were made by the cooperative  unions were subjected to major quality-related  claims, reducing
3 One  trader  reports  having  to pay Tsh. 20,000  for the right  to purchase  cashew  nuts in a particular  district.
3  Standard  grade  nuts  are defined  as those  contaning  not more  than  1/4%  foreign  matter  and not more  than
13  % (by  weight)  of damaged,  empty,  immature,  or old nuts.  Moisture  content  should  not exceed  13  %. Undergrade
nuts  are those  not meeting  these  requirements.
35Equally  disasterous  were  initial  private  attempts  to import  and distribute  sulphur  and  blowers  for  cashew  tree
dusting.  With  delays  in sulphur  shipments  and trade  documentation,  the imported  inputs  arrived  too late for use
before  the season,  leading  the firms  to have  to maintain  large  input  stocks  and incur  expensive  finance  charges.
36One firm  which  purchased  about  600  tons  during  the 1991/92  season  was  still  holding  this  (now  deteriorated)
stock  in April 1993.  A sizable  loss  was  predicted  on sales.
24actual sales values to less than $400/ton,  compared with invoice  prices of more than $600/ton. 37
Despite all this confusion, marketed  production did increassl  by 38% over the previous season,
reaching 41,238 tons. Favorable weather, an increase  in sulphur dusting in some locations (especially  in
Tinduru where a major government- and cooperative-directed  campaign took place), increased real
producer  prices, and prompt  payments  to farmers  all contributed  to a larger proportion  of cashew  owners
actually harvesting their crop and probably to a higher level of output.'  While exporting  most nuts in
raw form, the TCMB did put into operation two of its factories, processing 9000 tons of nuts. Once
again, however, this resulted in negative  value added as raw nut prices were favorable and Tanzania's
kernel exports received price  discounts. Although providing employment opportunities, TCMB's
processing  operations  were loss-making  as a result  of high unit costs and relatively  poor technical  results.
The competitive  disadvantage  faced by the TCMB is clearly illustrated in Table 10 below.
TCMB's use of mechanical processing, together with the organization's apparently poor technical
efficiency  in utilizing  this equipment  and weaknesses  in the raw material grading system, have resulted
in a situation  where the kernel-based  revenue  per ton of raw nuts processed in Tanzania is nearly 26%
lower than that obtained in India. This huge difference,  stemming  from Tanzania's lower yield of kernel
material and much lower proportion of realized whole kernels, has been a major reason why India has
been able to pay seemingly high prices for raw nuts and why the TCMB frequently achieves low or
negative  value added through processing.
The beginning of the 1992/93 season was characterized  by uncertainty and confusion.'  The
experience  of the prior season, together with  pessimistic  predictions  about  the Indian market  for raw nuts,
led some former or would-be private traders to  delay their registration or buying operations. The
uncertainty  was compounded  by mixed signals from the TCMB concerning  whether or not it would  buy
nuts from private traders. If not, then private firms would need  to depend entirely  upon their own export
channels. While the Lindi branch of TCMB did announce  that it would buy from private traders, this
branch did not have funds at the beginning  of the season and thus issued IOUs to traders. The Mtwara
branch of TCMB waited  until December  to announce  its intention  to buy from private traders, with this
delay designed  to protect the procurement  interests of the regional cooperative  union (MARCU).
Uncertainty  and confusion spread to the financing  of crop procurement  and to the prices which
producers would be paid. Under pressure to recover past loans and to weed out non-paying  clients, the
commercial  banks (particularly  the parastatal National  Bank of Commerce)  denied overdraft facilities  to
several  of the cooperative  unions and made loans to others contingent  on agreements  regarding  guideline
producer  prices and inter-store TCMB  buying prices. Negotiations  on these matters were protracted  and
things were not sorted out until December, three months into the buying season.
37  For example, MARCU had a contracted  price of $700/ton  for 3500 tons, although  realized sales earnings
were only $394/ton.
3S The Cashew Farmer Practices  Survey (1992), conducted  by the ODA Cashew  Research team, did show a
greater propensity  of farmers to harvest nuts.
39 The analysis  below  is based on field work  conducted  by the author  in March 1993.  Interviews  were conducted
with  government and  commercial bank  officials, with  officials of  the  TCMB and  several cooperative
unions/societies,  and with twenty-four  private trading companies/individuals.  The field work concentrated  in the
Mtwara  and Lindi Regions  and in Dar es Salaam. Tremendous  assistance  was provided by Commercial  Unit  of the
Cashew  Improvement  Programme.
25Table 10: Comparative  Cashew  Processing  Yields and Revenues
Grade  Price ($/lb.  Typical Production  Breakdown  Revenue  Breakdown  for
FOB)'  Composite  Ton of
Tanzania 2 India  Kernels ($ FOB)
Tanzania  India
|Wholel
W210  3.09  1%  3%  34  204
W240  2.80  3%  7%  185  432
W320  2.70  27%  47%  1607  2797
W450  2.65  14%  14%  818  818
Scorched  2.62  3%  6%  173  346
Dessert  1.93  7%  6%  298  255
Sub-Total  55%  83%  3114  4852
Brokens
Butts  2.09  9%  5%  415  231
Splits  2.15  14%  5%  663  237
Large White Pc.  1.82  17%  4%  681  160
Small  While Pc.  1.71  5%  3%  188  113
Sub-Total  45%  17%  1948  741
Total Revenue  $5062  $5593
Per Ton of
Kernels




2 Oltremere  system.
3 Assuming  an average of 19% kernel yield from raw nuts. Likombe factory achieved 18.7%
in 1990/91.
4 Assuming  an average of 23% kernel yield from raw nuts.
Source: Modified  from Agriconsult/AMEC  (1992)
While a few of the cooperative  unions (including  Ruvuma,  Coast, and DSM) did obtain  overdraft
facilities, the others (including  MARCU  and LIRECU in the most important  production  areas) would  need
to obtain  their financing  through the TCMB, which finally  obtained overdraft facilities  in December  and
January. Relatively high inter-store TCMB  buying prices of Tsh. 182-190/Kg.  (depending  upon region)
were agreed to. In determining the guideline  producer price, greatest consideration  was given to the
financial viability  of the cooperative  unions and to their ability to repay loans to the banks. Hence, the
sample budgets constructed  for the unions built in a sum of Tsh 20/kg. for finance costs. At the agreed
guideline  producer  price of Tsh. 125/kg.  for standard  grade, it was expected  that the unions would  obtain
26net margins of 10 to 12% which they could direct toward repayment  of arrears.40
The agreed guideline  producer prices of Tsh.  125/Kg. for SG and Tsh. 89/Kg. for UG were
lower than the official  prices for the previous year (e.g. Tsh. 137 and 89/Kg., respectively),  were lower
than the guideline prices which regional authorities  had already announced in some areas (e.g. Tsh.
140/Kg.  for SG in Lindi Region),  and were considerably  lower than the prices which  private traders were
actually paying in the beginning of the 1992/93 season (eg. between Tsh. 140 and 160/Kg. for SG).
While the lower guideline price was implemented  in the north and in Lindi Region, it was rejected
outright by farmers in parts of Mtwara Region, forcing MARCU  to increase  its procurement  prices.
Figure 2 provides a flow chart for the industry during the 1992/93  season. Three main channels
have emerged. One is organized by private exporters who have hired private traders or cooperatives
located  in major production  areas  to serve as their buying  agents.  The second channel  features  cooperative
unions  procuring  nuts from cooperative  societies  and then  trading on their own account.  The third channel
involves  private traders and cooperative  selling to the TCMB which in turn exports the raw nuts. The
discussion  below focuses primarily  on private trader activities.
Private Trader Activities
Although there were initial entry delays (particularly  among smaller traders), by January there
were many private traders active in the market. Compared with the prior season, relatively few
restrictions  were placed on private traders other than the stipulations  that they should  buy the crop from
cooperative  societies (and not directly from farmers) and that they should pay certain  local taxes. Some
traders intended  to buy only SG, although  in some districts  local authorities  forced  them to also buy UG.
Many of the smaller, part-time traders didn't bother to register themselves  with district authorities.  The
number of private traders buying at the local level probably  numbered  more than 200.
Three main types of private traders emerged this season as first handlers at the local or regional
levels (rable  11). One type, referred to here as "petty traders", consists  primarily  of farmers and office
employees who, with some limited initial savings, bought nuts from farmers in order to supply the
TCMB. Although initially  hesitant to enter the trade, these actors took the plunge once it was clear that
the established  inter-store  TCMB  price and the guideline  producer  prices afforded  a comfortable  margin.
Such traders generally experienced  problems in obtaining bank financing for their activities, despite
having adequate  security. As a result, they dealt in small quantities, relying on their sales turnover to
generate funds for further pur.;  ses. Most of these traders made use of hired vehicles to transport the
crop and many sought to by-pass  district and cooperative  levies by dealing directly  with farmers rather
than with cooperative  societies.
A second  type, referred to here as "buying  agents/stockists"  consists  of business  people who  were
also attracted by the favorable  margins  available  on sales to the TCMB. Such individuals/firms  typically
own a shop and run some sort of transport  business. Quite a few of them have also become involved  in
stocking  sulphur and blowers and/or providing  spraying services  on contract (in return for nuts). While
some have received  limited overdraft  facilities  from Banks, most relied upon savings  for initial  purchases
and on subsequent  sales turnover to finance further  purchases. These traders operated on a considerably
larger scale than the first group, handling  several hundred tons each during the 1992/93  season.
Calculated  from  cooperative  cost/revenue  budgets.
27Figure  2: Cashew  Nut Channels  In Tanzania
(1992/  93 Season)
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Through  March 10. 1993Table 11: Profiles of Three 'Types' of Private Cashew Nut First Handlers
'Type'  Main  Activities  Typical  Source  of  Quantities Mode  of  Prior  Market  Form  of
Etnic  Finance  for  Handled  Crop  Cashew  Oudet  Remuneration
Origin  Purchases  (rons)  Transport  Trading
Experience
Petty  Trader  Farming;  Indigenous  Savings;  Crop  < 25  Hired  No  Other  Margin  on
Office  Turnover  Vehicle  Traders;  Inter-store
Employee  TCMB  Price
Buying  Farming;  Indigenous  Crop  50 -400  Own  No  TCMB  Margin  on
Agent/Stockist Inputs  Stockist;  Turnover;  Truck  Inter-store
Transport  Bank  overdraft  Price
Commodity  Commodity  Tanzanian  Exporter;  Bank  200  - Fleet  of  Frequently  Private  Commission
Trader/Agent  Trade;  Freight-  Asian  overdraft  3500  Trucks  Exporter
forwarding
29The third type of trader consists  of family-based  enterprises  involved  in wider commodity  trading,
transport, and other ventures  (e.g. petrol stations).  These firms serve as cashew  buying agents  for DSM-
based exporters. The local traders are provided  with money and instructed  on the quantities  and source
areas preferred. Receiving  a commission,  these firms use their local knowledge  to procure the nuts and
often to manage loading  and freight-forwarding  from Mtwara port. Several  of these firms have a history
in the cashew trade, either with the present or former generation involved in similar procurement
arrangements.  These firms became  active  in trade in sesame,  cassava,  and other  products in the late 1980s
and found that cashew  nuts fit well into their trading calendar, keeping  both staff and vehicles employed
(see Table 12)
Table 12: Illustrative Trading Calendar of Multi-Commodity Trader
Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec.  Jan.  Feb.  Mrc.  Apr.  May  Jun  Jul  Aug
Cashew Nuts  >
Sulphur ->
Sesame->




At the first handler level, competition  was still not strong during this second  year of a liberalized
market. Several factors contributed  to this. One was the overall shortage  of finance available, with the
number  of traders in possession  of cash being  present at any one time in the villages being  limited to only
one or very few. A second reason is a common practice amongst traders to by-pass villages where
another private trader is known  to be active. The reasons for this are not very clear. However, it is the
case that private traders have sought to (and have apparently  sr.cceeded  to) 'buy' primary cooperative
society  secretaries  through the payment  of a small commission  (e.g. Tsh. 1/Kg.) or through the provision
of a gift such as a radio or bicycle. Such cooperative  officials wzuld seek to guarantee  village supplies
for the favored  buyer by telling  other would-be  buyers that the local crop is already commnitted  to another
party.' 1 Third, price competition  was deadened  by the announcement  of guideline  or 'indicative' prices.
Given the many years of government-directed  prices, the notion of an 'indicative' price is not well
understood and most traders and primary societies tended to settle on prices at or very close to the
'indicative' prices. The fact that cooperative  unions were paying the 'indicative' price re-inforced  this
notion of an official  price.
While the majority of the local first handlers  are indigenous  traders, some of the larger traders
and all of the exporter buying agents are long-established  Tanzanian  Asian trading companies.  Table 13
provides a breakdown  of the suppliers  to the Lindi branch of the TCMB during the 1992/93  season. In
indicates  that, at least for the trade directed  through the TCMB, indigenous  firms have been able to hold
their own.
41  As one trader  noted,  the  objective  is to have  the cooperative  secretary  tell would-be  competitors  that there
are 'no vacancies'  in the  village  for cashews.
30Table 13: Cashew Nut Suppliers to TCMB Lindi
(1992/93 Season)
First Handler/Supplier  Quantity  Supplied  Proportion
Coop. Society/Union  293.6  6.5%
R.T.C. (Public  Enterprise)  202.5  4.5%
Private Traders  3988.2  89.0%
Of which:
Tanzanian  Asian (14)  2048.6  45.7%
Indigenous  (17)  1939.6  43.3%
Sources: TCMB Lindi Buying Records; Lindi Regional Agricultural  Staff.
The pattern for private exporters is quite different. During the 1992/93 season, twelve private
companies  undertook (or were preparing) exports, accounting  for about 40% of the country's raw nut
trade. Nine of these exporters were interviewed,  basic information  on which is provided in Table 14
below. By Tanzanian standards, each of these firms is quite large or is part of a larger group of
companies. In contrast with the mixed pattern found for local buyers/traders, each of the exporters  is
owned and/or managed  by Tanzanian  Asians, typically family-based  companies  or partnerships.  As the
Table indicates, only one firm concentrates on cashew nut trading, but even this firm is part of a
conglomerate.  Each of the other firms is active  in trading of a wide range of commodities,  plus most are
also active in the transport business  and in agro-processing  ventures. During the 1992/93  season, cashew
nut trading accounted  for 20% or less of the turnover  of most of these firms. These firms are also among
the country's largest  traders of non-traditional  agricultural  commodities,  including  sesame, cassava  roots,
and others.
Table 15 outlines  the trade mix of one of the largest emergent  cashew nut exporters. Notice  both
the extensive  range of products and the diversity  of markets  served. These new cashew  nut exporters  are
generally  quite experienced  in international  trade or else have hired experienced  managers from abroad
to develop this business. Several of the new exporters  had experience  in cashew nut trading during the
1960s and 1970s.
While several of the firms financed their cashew nut purchases out of their own funds, most
obtained some additional funding, either from local commercial  banks or from external buyers or
affiliated companies.  Such external finance  provided a strong competitive  edge, as money was available
on a timely  basis and was available  at interest rates below 10%, compared  with the 27-31% interest  rates
on local overdraft facilities.
As noted above, the private exporters are generally not directly involved in the local-level
procurement  of the crop. They instead  have relied upon private traders (or less commonly  cooperatives)
based in the main production  areas to arrangement  crop collection,  grading, farmer payments, and the
preparation  of consignments  for shipment.  The buying  agents  are not strangers;  several  are linked  through
family, while others have previously dealt with the exporter with other commodities (e.g.  sesame,
cassava). Trust is essential in this type of trade, given the relatively large sums of money which the
exporter provides the agent to make purchases, and given the fact that the exporter is simultaneously
negotiating  forward export contracts  for which the agent's supplies will help fulfill.
31Table 14: Characteristics of Surveyed Private Cashew Nut Exporters
Company  Year  Ownehip  Fixed  Cashew  Cashew  prior  Source  of  Other  Activitiesrading
Established  Assets  Export  Tunover as  Cashew  Financg
(S 000)  Volume  % of Total  Trading
._____  _____  (Tons)'  Earnings  Expenence  __
TWD  1989  Tan.  Asian  3700  No  External  Commercial  Import  and
Individual  Export
ETC  1992  Tan. Asian  120  2800  20%  No  Own  Commodity  Exports
+ U.K.  Relief  Agency  Sales
Partership
FDHN  1947  Tan. Asian  2500  2045  13%  yes  Own  +  Commodity  Exports
Family  Bank  Oilseed  Milling
BDS  _  _  Tan. Asian  500  2150  20%  No  Own +  Commodity  Exports
Individual  (1150)  External  Seed  Beans
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~  ~~~~~~Transport_
RPR  1989  Tan.  Asian  170  2000  20%  Yes  Own +  Commodity  Trade
Family  (1000)  Bank  TextilesI
AMKT  Tan.  Asian  100  1300  50%  No  Own +  Commodity  Exports
Parteship  Bank  lems
.. __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Pharmaceuicals
KRSH  1991  Tan.  Asian  15  1200  100%  Yes  Own  +  Part  of Large  Holding
+ U.S.  (1200)  Bank  Company
Parnership
ABTR  1973  Tan.  Asian  2500  270  6%  No  Own  Commodity  Exports
Family  Transport/Clearing
I__  _ _ _ _I_  _  I__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _I__  _  _  _  I__  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  I__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  I__  _  _  _  _  _  _  Spare  Parts
MENT  1983  Tan. Asian  4050  0  N.A.  No  Own  Commodity  Exports
I___  _Family  _  _  (600)
1 Figuues  in ( ) are tonnage  of 1991/92  crop  exported  in 1992/93.
Source:  Author's  Survey  (March  1993)
32Table IS: Commodity  Export Mix of Major Private Cashew  Tmder
(1992(93  Sean)
Commodity  Market Distination  Quantity  (Tols)  Value ($ 000)
Cashew  Nuts  India  2045  1,496
Cotton Seed Cake  Western  Europe  16,000  1,436
Cocoa Beans  U.K.; Netherlands  670  589
Sesame  Seed  Turkey; Japan  1026  540
Beeswax  Japan  152  413
Cassava  Roots  Western Europe  3000  345
Yellow  Gram  India, Ethiopia  1714  257
Pigeon  Peas  India; U.K.  755  217
Castor Seeds  Europe;  Japan  736  146
Mfiscellaneous  Minor  Items'  Pakistan; Zaire  219
27,300  5658
1 Including  betle nuts, cardamom,  copra cake, cooking  oil, and gum arabic.
Source:  Private Exporter  Trade Records
33Similarly, export transactions  are not conducted  with strangers. Several  firms direct their trade
toward affiliated  companies  or through buyers/brokers  with whom  they have  had past trading experience.
Few of the firms deal directly  with Indian  processors. Instead, they rely upon offshore brokerage firms
(based in places such as Singapore  and the Virgin Islands)  which provide reliable financial and shipping
services and which guarantee  product quality to the eventual  buyer.
The interviewed  exporters  were asked  to rate various  potential  problems  on a scale of 1 to 5, with
5 signifying  a 'major problem or bottleneck' and 1 signifying  that the factor is not a problem faced by
them in their procurement  or sales. Table 16 aggregates  the results of this exercise.
Table 16: Private Exporter Assessment  of Problems
(1 to 5 Scale; 1  = No Problem, 3  Moderate  Problem, 5=  Severe Problem)
Factor/Problem  Rank  Average  Rating
Poor Communications  to  1  4.2
Producing Areas
Poor Roads  2  3.7
Taxation/Cesses  3  3.1
Availability  of Cashew Nuts  4  2.8
Access to Short-Term  Finance  5  2.7
Lack of Time/Conflicting  6  2.7
Activities
Inflation/Price  Instability  7  2.4
Lack of Market Information  8  2.3
Availability/Cost  of Packaging  9  2.3
Materials
Official Restrictions  on  10  2.1
Cashew Procurement
Inadequate  Transport/Storage  11  2.0
Facilities
Lack of Market Outlets  12  2.0
High Cost of Cashew Nuts  13  1.9
Unreliability  of Buyers  14  1.8
Source: Author's Field Survey (March 1993)
According to the exporters, the most significant  problem is social infrastructure (telephones,
roads) linking them or their buying agents  with the main production  areas. This raises overall transaction
costs in crop procurement.  Taxation  is the next concern  of significance,  especially  the (increasing)  local
34cesses imposed by district authorities.  In some locations, the sum of educational, building, and other
funds totals up to Tsh. 18/Kg.  While traders are normally required to pay part of the fees, these fees are
in fact simply  taxes on local producers.' 2
Exporters  indicated  that the storage  and transport  facilities  which they  own or lease are more than
adequate  for their present trading  activities.  In fact, not a single  firm indicated  that it needed  to make  any
additional  investment  in order to enter into the cashew trade. In the southern zone, there is significant
unused storage facilities, especially at the depots of the National Milling Corporation and at the idle
cashew nut factories. Varied  responses  were given to the question  about  finance. This was not a problem
for those firms who  receive financing  from overseas  affiliates  or buyers, yet it was reported  to be a costly
and difficult  barrier for those firms having to rely upon local commercial  banks. The exporters do not
see marketing  (including  market information,  market outlets, and buyer reliability)  as a serious  constraint
to the current trading activities.
Private exporters were asked about their potential interest (or emerging plans) to enter into
cashew nut processing to replace or supplement  raw nut exports to India. Several firms, each with
external  partners, have been engaged  in discussions  with the TCMB  to lease one or more of the existing
factories. At least one of these deals is expected  to go through in time for operations  during the 1993/94
season. A few other exporters expressed scepticism regarding the financial viability of the complete
mechanical  processing systems. They have been exploring alternative, semi-mechanized  technologies
whose operating scales are significantly lower than the existing factories. In  March of  1993, no
investments  of this type were imminent.  A third option, suggested  by one of the firms, was to canabalize
a few of the existing factories, utilizing the best features from the Oltremere  and Cashco systems, yet
building in less mechanized  features for several processes.
Dimensions  of Performance
During the 1992/93 season, the overall performance  of the industry was mixed. Total marketed
production declined  to about 35,000 tons, the decline  being attributed  to an unseasonal  cold spell which
damaged  flowers and reduced fruit setting. Still, on the agronomic  side, there was evidence  of increased
efforts to combat the powdery mildew problem (through sulphur spraying) and to rehabilitate cashew
shambas.' 3
One  of the major objectives  beyond the market liberalization  was to improve  the reliability  of the
crop procurement system and to raise farmer incomes. To some extent, progress has been made. In
contrast with past seasons  when crop buying was not completed  until April or later, this season  virtually
the entire crop was purchased  by the end of February, and in some areas, by the end of January. This
occured despite the delays in bank overdraft approvals. Also in contrast with past experience, farmers
were paid this season on a timely basis, especially when private traders paid cash either directly to
farmers or to the cooperative  societies. The activities  of private traders undoubtedly  put pressure on the
42Data on producer prices for cashews  provided  by the Marketing  Development  Bureau  are thus misleading  as
they do not take into account these  cesses. When taken into account, the share of farmers  in the export value this
past season was only 40-45%, depending  upon location.
43  The evidence,  coming from surveys  by the ODA Cashew Research  team and from the loan applications  of
the commercial  banks, does indicate  that it is primarily farmers  with above average landholdings  and other assets
which are obtaining finance and making the investments  to restore cashew productivity.  The vast majority of
smallholders  have not made such investments.
35cooperative  unions and societies to improve their services  to farmers.'
Nevertheless, relatively few farmers benefitted from the relatively high prices (e.g. Tsh. 140-
160/Kg. for SO) which private traders were offering at the very beginning  of the season. While trade
figures for the entire season are not yet complete,  the share of farmers in the export value is likely to
have fallen back below 50% (see Table 17). Given the profit margins earned on exports (see below) and
given the level of producer prices prior to the announcement  of guideline  prices, it would appear that
official Interventions  resulted in a transfer  of income from farmers to private traders/cooperatives/banks
amounting  to some Tsh. 525 million.' Direct taxes on producers, in the form of local cesses, probably
amounted  to about Tsh. 350 million (e.g. an average of Tsh. 10/Kg).
Table 17: Recent Trends in Producer Prices
________________________  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _  (1sh  ./K  g  .)'
Season  Standard  Grade  Undergrade  Weighted 2 Share of Export
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _V  alu e
1989/90  84  56  82.6  57%
1990/91  __  _73_  _73  _  108.2  _  56%
1991/92  137  89  132.2  66%
1992/93  120 - 140  80 - 90  110.0 -127.5  47 - 54%3
1 Does not take into account local cesses  paid by farmers which vary significantly  by district (e.g.
between  T.Sh. 2 and 18 per kg.)
2 For 1989/90  and 1990/91  weighted  95% SG + 5% UG. For 1991/92  and 1992/93  the
respective  ratios are 90/10 and 75/25.
3 Only raw nuts exported. Estimated  average FOB value at $700/ton.
Source: Marketing  Development  Bureau and Author's Field Work
During the season, both farmers and traders did move cashew nuts across district and regional
borders in order to counter or take advantage  of differentials  in guideline/actual  producer prices and in
local cesses. This 'migration' of the crop also took the form of chasing  the available cash as in some
villages,  districts, and regions  there were periods in which cooperatives,  the TCMB, and locally  operating
private traders did not have cash to make  purchases.  As a result of these 'migrations' district-level  figures
for marketed  production  showed  considerable  anomalies  with huge recorded increases  in some areas and
major declines in others.
44One  future difficulty  is foreseen  here. It is still the cooperative  unions and societies  which  provide most of
the input  loans and inputs  to farmers,  with repayment  coming  through  deductions  on the delivered  crop. With  private
traders taming  an increasing  proportion of the cashew  crop (and other crops), input loan recovery way become a
severe problem for the cooperatives.
45 Given  export prices and the shilling exchange  rate, still very comfortable  margins would  have been earned
by the private  trade with a producer price of Tsh. 140/Kg..  At this producer  price, the cooperative  unions who sold
to the TCMB could have covered  their finance  charges  and still had a modest  profit to begin repayment  of arrears.
36Due to differential  access to transport facilities,  it was traders rather than farmers who were able
to best take advantage  of these inter-district  price and tax variations. The available  evidence  suggests  that
local (e.g. first handler) trader operations  were quite profitable  this season as a result of the set TCMB
buying prices and the guideline  producer prices. An indication  of this is provided in Table 18. The first
column is for a Masasi-based  trader who procured nuts within a 25 km radius of the town and then sold
to TCMB in Masasi. For this low risk operation, this trader obtained  a margin of 12.8%. The second
column concerns  a trader in Nachingwea  who transported  nuts to Lindi to sell to TCMB at much  higher
inter-store price. The trading margin was considerably  higher.
Table 18: Private Cashew Trader Margins on Sales to TCMB (1992/93 Season)
(All Values are Tsh./Kg.)
Cost or Price  Masasi Trader Supplying  Nachingwea  Trader Supplying
TCMB in Masasi  TCMB in Lindi
Producer Price  127.0  120.0
Levies/Cesses/Duties  14.4  9.40
Village Secretary Conmmission  N.A.  1.00
Transport Costs  2.0  12.0
Packaging  Costs  4.35  4.35
Finance Charges  N.A.  3.60
Depreciation  (On Vehicles)  N.A.  4.10
Overhead,  Labor, Insurance  1.70  5.50
Total Costs  149.45  159.95
TCMB  Inter-Store Price  166.45  190.00
Trader Margin  19.20 (12.8%)  30.05 (18.8%)
Source: Author's Trader Interviews
Overall, private traders accounted  for about 43% of the crop procured directly from either
farmers or cooperative  societies and, by the completion  of sales, will probably account for a similar
proportion of the export volume. However, with the TCMB and several of the cooperative  unions not
obtaining finance until December or January, the export-oriented  private traders (through  their buying
agents) were able to procure most of the high quality nuts from the 1992/93  harvest. That is, all or a
large proportion of the nuts from Tinduru and Nachingwea  Districts (all known for high-quality  nuts)
were eventually  procured  by private traders. In contrast, most of the nuts in Newala  District (the quality
of which is uneven  or poor) were left for the TCMB  and MARCU.  In Masasi  District, while  procurement
was more or less equally  divided between  MARCU  and eight private traders, the majority of MARCU's
stock was classified  as undergrade.  Traders  supplying  both private exporters  and TCMB  tended to provide
the former with standard  grade nuts and the latter with undergrades  (selling them as standard  grade if
possible).
While the TCMB was still negotiating  with foreign  buyers/brokers  in March, most of the private
37exports were shipped by the end of February. Being  financially  handcuffed  by the banks and eventually
obtaining  a lower quality  stock of supplies,  it is likely that the average  export  prices earned  by the TCMB
will have been considerably  lower than those obtained  by the private traders.
As  noted earlier, private trader efforts during the  1991/92 season to  export were largely
unsuccessful,  with both product  quality and buyer unreliability  problems.  Firms entering  the trade during
the 1992/93 season faired much better. FOB prices were mostly within a range of $675 to 715/Ton.
While lower than for the previous  season (when  average  exports  were $813/Ton),  the exporters  benefitted
from a devaluation  of the Tanzania Shilling  from 290 per $1 in March 1992 to 345 per $1 a year later.
This, together with the lower producer  prices, provided  comfortable  trading margins  (e.g. 12 - 20%) for
most exporters this season. The trading costs and earnings for two companies (two transactions) are
illustrated  in Table 19.
Table 19: Illustrative Exporter Trading Costs and Profits (1992/93 Season)
l________________________  (Figures in Tsh./Kg. or $/Ton)  l
Cost or Price Item  Cashew  Nuts Procured in  Cashew Nuts Procured in
Masasi in January and  Tinduru in December and
Exported via Mtwara Port in  Exported  via Mtwara Port in
Late February  Late January
Price to Producer  127  130
Levies/Cesses  18.0  15.0
Commissions  to Buying  6.0  6.5
Agents and/or Cooperative
Officials  I
Transport Costs to Mtwara  16.0  19.0
Packaging  Materials  4.35  4.35
Weight Loss  1.4  1.5
Finance Charges  13.25  13.56
Overhead  Costs  4.0  4.5
Port/Inspection/Handling  6.6  6.6
Total Costs  196.6  201.01
at Tsh. 345 =  $1  at Tsh. 330.3 =  $1
$570/Ton  $608.8/Ton
F.O.B. Earnings'  $689.5/Ton  $691.5/Ton
Exporter Margin  $119.5/Ton (20.9%)  $82.7/Ton (13.6%)
1 Assuming  1.5% weight loss in transit and $68/Ton for freight and insurance.
Source: Author's Field Interviews
38During the 1992/93  season, all processing  factories  were completely  idle. Prior to the season, the
large permanent work staff at several of the factories was let go. With both the TCMB and the
cooperative unions under pressure from  the banks to  repay loans and  with  their delayed crop
procurement,  It was not possible  to undertake  processing  because  of the extended  delay which this would
entail in terms of payment from the downstream  buyer. While discussions  were held between several
private firms and the TCMB regarding the latter performing custom processing services, no such
arrangements  were actually implemented.46
Conclusion
In the period  between World  War 11  and the early 1970s,  Tanzania  developed  one of the world's
largest  cashew nut industries.  By 1973/74  marketed  production  reached 145,000  tons (about  30% of total
world production)  and exports were among  the highest in the world. Cashews  were the country's fourth
largest source of foreign exchange and provided an important source of income to some 250,000
smallholder  farmers. This trade was initially developed  and organized  by private traders (of Indian and
Arab origin), although during the 1960s a multi-tiered  marketing  systemr.-involving  local cooperative
societies, regional cooperative unions, and a  marketing board-  was imposed, with private traders
progressively  being removed from the marketing  system.
The steady rise in production and trade during the 1950s and 1960s has been mirrored by a
dramatic  and ste  4  decline  of the industry  since  then. Despite  a buoyant  international  market, Tanzania's
cashew nut production  fell to less than 17,000  tons by the late 1980s and its prior reputation  for a high
quality  product  was badly  damaged.  As examined  here, several  factors  contributed  to this downward  spin,
including  the country's villagization  program, a sharp and virtually continuous  decline in real producer
prices, and major inefficiencies  in cooperative  and marketing board crop collection and downstream
activities.  Government  'education' campaigns  (and threats)  were insufficient  to counter  the loss of farmer
incentives  due to declining  services and incomes. The massive  decline  in production  has not only had a
sharp adverse affect on living standards in the southern regions, but has led most of the large-scale,
donor-funded,  government-owned,  state-of-the-art  processing factories  to become 'white elephants'.
With the industry on the brink of complete  collapse, the Tanzanian government announced  in
1991  that the cashew  nut market would  be liberalized  with private firms permitted  to undertake  trade once
again. As analyzed  here, the reform  process  has been extremely  confusing  and messy, although  there are
signs that the industry may be  set for  a recovery. Whether by  design or  default, the policies of
liberalization  were poorly communicated  by the central  government,  leaving  local authorities  to use their
own decretion  and ad hoc procedures  in implementing  the new set of rules regarding  trade. The first year
of the reform (1991/92)  was largely a failure with few private traders licensed, virtually no competition,
continued controls over prices and crop movements, and poor results when private and cooperative
enterprises  sought to market cashew nuts outside  of the TCMB.
The second season of the 'liberalized' market  featured some improvements,  yet still considerable
confusion. Private traders were widely licensed, yet there was little commercial  bank finance available
either to them, to cooperatives,  or to the marketing  board. In order to insure that official  loans extended
to the cooperatives  and marketing  board were recovered, an agreement  was reached between  these  parties
and the regional governments  to set 'indicative'  producer  prices at levels 10-15%  lower than the previous
season. Private firms, which had been paying farmers  considerably  higher prices at the beginning  of the
46  Neither private firms nor cooperative  unions  have much confidence  in TCMB's ability to process  nuts on an
efficient basis. For its part, the TCMB was requiring firms to deliver a minimum  of 1000 tons before it would
consider custom  processing activities.
39season, complied with the 'indicative' prices by reducing their own prices and pocketing the windfall.
Government  and commercial  bank interventions  thus resulted in a huge transfer of income from poor
farmers to a combination  of banks, cooperatives,  and private firms.
Some positive trends are emerging, however. With the entry of private traders, farmers are
having their crop collected  soon after harvest and are being paid promptly (not only by private traders
but also by cooperatives  which are feeling the competitive  heat). This is leading farmers to harvest rather
than neglect  their cashews  and has led some of the better endowed  farmers  to rehabilitate  their farms and
plant new cashew seedlings.  Over the past two seasons, marketed  production has averaged 37,000 tons
and export revenues  have recovered  to their level of the early 1980s.
More and more private firms are entering  the trade and collectively,  they accounted  for 43  % of
the purchased  crop during the 1992/93  season. Most individual  firms are very small and have undertaken
the low risk activity of buying from farmers and selling to the TCMB  at a guaranteed  price. The larger
players are firms which are generally active in domestic and export marketing  of a wide range of non-
traditional commodities. Some have excellent international  trading contacts which they are using in
developing  their own cashew  nut exports. Besides  a few cooperative  unions (whose  export  operations  have
mostly been a failure), each of the emerging  private exporters  belong to ethnic minorities.
Due to uncertainty about government  policies (and their possible revision or reversal), private
firms have not yet made any investments  in production  or marketing  infrastructure  for cashews.  They are
still utilizing trucks, warehouses, and other infrastructure  used for other commodity  trade. With the
confidence  gained and profits earned during the 1992/93  season, this is likely to change, with some firms
also likely  to begin  to develop  their own cashew  farms and/or develop  closer links with producers. Some
firms have expressed an interest in processing  the nuts locally.
Under the current  policy environment,  and with considerable  uncertainty  as to whether  Tanzania's
highly-mechanized  processing  factories can be financially  viable even if operated on a commercial  basis
by private firms, the most appropriate strategy is to enable interested  private firms to lease selected
TCMB factories  while at the same time encouraging  these  or other firms to investigate  alternative,  semi-
mechanized  technologies.  Leasing of the large-scale  factories, for periods of one to five years, would
expand  the resources available  to the private sector without  significantly  increasing  its exposure  to policy
reversal risk. This approach  would signify the government's commitment  to the continued  liberalization
of trade, plus provide the government  with some return on its factory investments.  Still, the long-term
competitiveness  of Tanzania's industry will likely require changes in the technologies  used, toward a
lower degree of mechanization  and toward reduced dependence  upon fuel oil as an input. While some
adaptions  can be made within  the existing  factories  or by combining  certain  features  of the Oltremare  and
Cashco systems,  it would be  expedient for  would-be processors to  explore and  test alternative
technologies.
40Bibliography
Agriconsult/AMEC  (1992)  Study  Report  on the Best Possible  Utilization  of the Currently  Idle Cashewnut
Processing  Plants. for the Ministry  of Agriculture,  Livestock  Development  and Cooperatives.  Dar
es Salaam.
Anonymous  (1962) "Industrial  Processing  Opportunities,"  Tanganyika  Industrial  Development,  p.44-52.
Anonymous  (1963) "Potential  of the Cashew Nut," Tanganyika  Trade Journal (1), #5, p.28-29.
Austin, J. (1991) Cashew  Exporting from Mozambique:  Companhia  Do Caju De Nacala. Mimeo.
Duncan, I. (1988) Tanzania Cashew Nut Marketing. Report for Cashew Nut Production  Improvement
Pilot Project. April.
Ellis, F. (1979) "A Preliminary  Analysis  of the Decline in Tanzanian  Cashewnut  Production, 1974-1979:
Causes, Possible Remedies and Lessons for Rural Development  Policy," Economic  Research
Bureau 79.1. University  of Dar es Salaam.
(1980) "Marketing Costs and the Processing  of Cashewnuts  in Tanzania: An Analysis of the
Marketing  and the Potential  Level of the Producer Price. ERB 79.2.
(1982) "Agriculture  Price Policy in Tanzania," World Development,  Vol. 10, p.263-83.
FAO (1969) Cashew  Nut Processing.  Agricultural  Services  Bulletin  #6. Rome.
Commercial  Service Unit (CIP) (1983) "Marketing  Commentary".  Mimeo. February.
(1993) "Mid-Term  Review". Mimeo. February.
Food Studies Group (Oxford) and Departnent of Rural Economey (Morogoro) (1992) Agricultural
Diversification  and Intensification  Study. September. Oxford.
Havnevik,  K. (1979) "Charcoal  and Cashewnut  Production  in Rufiji", Bureau  of Resources  and Land Use
Planning, University  of Dar es Salaam, Paper 79/13.
Jaffee, S. (1993) "Mission  Report on Export-oriented  Agroindustries  in Mozambique,"  Agriculture and
Environment  Division, Southern  African Department,  World Bank.
Marketing Development  Bureau (1992) "An Assessment of the New Cashewnut Marketing System,
1991/92). Dar es Salaam.
(Various Years) Review  of Cashewnuts.
Msangi, J., C. Griffiths, and W. Banyikwar  (1987) "Man's Response  to Change in the Coastal  Zone of
Tanzania". Department  of Geography, University  of Dar es Salaam.
Ohler, J. (1979) Cashew. Amsterdam:  Koninklijk  Institute voor de Tropen.
41Northwood, P.  (1962) "Cashew Production in the Southern Province of Tanganyika," East Africa
Agriculture and Forestry Journal, (28), p.35-39.
and H. Kayumbo  (1970)  "Cashew  Production  in Tanzania,"  World Crops, March/April., p.88-91
ODA Cashew Research Project (1992) "A Household Agricultural  Marketing Survey in the Six Main
Cashew Growing  Farming System Zones in the Southern  Zone of Tanzania, 1991". Mtwara.
(1992) "Cashew  Farmer Practices Survey 1992". Mtwara.
Rosengarten, F. (1975) The Book of Edible Nuts. New York: Walker and Company.
Tsakaris, A. (1967) "Cashew  Nut Production  in Southern  Tanzania, 2-A Survey  of Peasant  Holdings  at
Lulindi", East Africa Agricultural  and Forestry Journal, (22), p.35-39
United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives,  Agricultural  Division Annual
Report, various years. Dar es Salaam.
World Bank (1983)  Tanzania  Agricultural  Sector Report. Washington,  D.C.
(1991)  Tanzania  Economic  Report:  Towards  Sustainable  Development  in the 1990s.  Washington,
D.C.
42Policy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1249  Competitiveness  and  Environmental  Piritta  Sorsa  February  1994  P.  Kokila
Standards:  Some  Exploratory  Resufts  33716
WPS1250  Explaining  Miracles:  Growth  William  Easterly  February  1994  R.  Martin
Regressions  Meet  the  Gang  of  Four  39026
WPS1251  Excise  Taxes  John  F. Due  February  1994  C. Jones
37699
WPS1252  On  the  Dangers  of  Decentralization Remy  Prud'homme  February  1994  TWUITD
31005
WPS1253  Can  Competition  Policy  Control  301  ?  J. Michael  Finger  February  1994  M.  Patena
K.  C.  Fung  37947
WPS1254  What  Are  OECD  Trade  Preferences Alexander  J. Yeats  February  1994  J. Jacobson
Worth  to Sub-Saharan  Africa?  33710
WPS1255  Intrahousehold  Resource  Allocation: Lawrence  Haddad  February  1994  P.Cook
An  Overview  John  Hoddinott  33902
Harold  Alderman
WPS1256  World  Fossil  Fuel  Subsidies  and  Bjom  Larsen  February  1994  C.  Jones
Global  Carbon  Emissions  in a Model  37699
with  Interfuel  Substitution
WPS1257  Old-Age  Security  in Transitional  Louise  Fox  February  1994  E. Vincent
Economies  82350
WPS1258  Decentralizing  Infrastructure:  Richard  Bird  February  1994  WDR
For  Good  or  for III?  31393
WPS1259  The  Reform  of  Fiscal  Systems  in  Robin  Boadway  February  1994  C.  Jones
Developing  and  Emerging  Market  Sandra  Roberts  37754
Economies:  A Federalism  Perspective  Anwar  Shah
WPS1260  When  Is  a Life  Too  Costly  to Save?  George  L.  Van  Houtven  February  1994  A. Maranon
Evidence  from  U.S.  Environmental Maureen  L Cropper  39074
Regulations
WPS1261  A Political-Economy  Analysis  of  Arvind  Panagariya  March  1994  N.  Artis
Free  Trade  Areas  and  Customs  Ronald  Findlay  37947
Unions
WPS1262  Flexibility  in  Sri  Lanka's  Labor  Market Martin  Rama  March  1994  P.  Cook
33902
WPS1263  The  Effects  of  Barriers  on  Equity  Stijn  Claessens  March  1994  F.  Hatab
Investment  in Developing  Countries Moon-Whoan  Rhee  35835Policy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Tltle  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1264  A Rock  and  a Hard  Place:  The  Two  J. Michael  Finger  March  1994  M.  Patenia
Faces  of  U.S.  Trade  Policy  Toward  Korea  37947
WPS1265  Parallel  Exchange  Rates  in  Miguel  A.  Kiguel  March  1994  R.  Luz
Developing  Countries:  Lessons  from  Stephen  A.  O'Connell  34303
Eight  Case  Studies
WPS1266  An  Efficient  Frontier  for International  Sudhakar  Satyanarayan March  1994  D. Gustafson
Portfolios  with  Commodity  Assets  Panos  Varangis  33732
WPS1267  The  Tax  Base  in  Transition:  The  Case Zeljko  Bogetic  March  1994  F. Smith
of  Bulgaria  Arye  L.  Hillman  36072
WPS1268  The  Reform  of  Mechanisms  for  Eliana  La  Ferrara  March  1994  N. Artis
Foreign  Exchange  Allocation:  Theory Gabriel  Castillo  38010
and  Lessons  from  Sub-Saharan  John  Nash
Africa
WPS1269  Union-Nonunion  Wage  Differentials  Alexis  Panagides  March  1994  I. Conachy
in  the  Developing  World:  A  Case  Harry  Anthony  Patrinos  33669
Study  of  Mexico
WPS1270  How  Land-Based  Targeting  Affects  Martin  Ravallion  March  1994  P.  Cook
Rural  Poverty  Binayak  Sen  33902
WPS1271  Measuring  the  Effect  of External  F.  Desmond  McCarthy  March  1994  M.  Divino
Shocks  and  the  Policy  Response  to  J. Peter  Neary  33739
Them:  Empirical  Methodology  Applied  Giovanni  Zanalda
to  the  Philippines
WPS1272  The  Value  of Superfund  Cleanups:  Shreekant  Gupta  March  1994  A.  Maranon
Evidence  from  U.S.  Environmental  George  Van  Houtven  39074
Protection  Agency  Decisions  Maureen  L.  Cropper
WPS1273  Desired  Fertility  and  the  Impact  of  Lant  H. Pritchett  March  1994  P.  Cook
Population  Policies  Lawrence  H.  Summers  33902
WPS1274  The  New  Trade  Theory  and  Its  Asad  Alam  March  1994  A.  Alarn
Relevance  for Developing  Countries  87380
WPS1275  Female-Headed  Households,  Ricardo  Barros  March  1994  K. Binkley
Poverty,  and  the  Welfare  of  Children Louise  Fox  81143
in Urban  Brazil
WPS1276  Is  There  Persistence  in  the  Growth  Ashoka  Mody  March  1994  M.  Patena
of Manufactured  Exports?  Evidence Kamil  Yilmaz  37947
from  Newly  Industrializing  Countries
WPS1277  Private  Trader  Response  to  Market  Steven  Jaffee  March  1994  C.  Spooner
Uberalization  in Tanzania's  Cashew  32116
Nut  Industry